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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay provides an analysis 
of the interaction between special interest groups, public interest factors, median 
voters' tastes and preferences regarding the provision of medical services for the 
poor, and cost containment policies on one side, and drug reimbursement levels, the 
size of state Medicaid programs, and the size of states’ drug budgets on the other.
The relative strengths of special interest are shown to be one of the most important 
determinants of drug reimbursement levels and drug expenditures. The median 
voters’ preferences significantly explain the size of states’ Medicaid programs. The 
results verify the existence of substantial variation in state Medicaid programs, and 
point to potentially growing disparities as a result of current policies.
The second essay examines alternatives to the traditional retrospective fee for 
service (FFS) payment mechanisms regarding Medicaid inpatient hospital services. 
These alternatives may be grouped into direct price or utilization controls, 
particularly, prospective payment and coverage limitations, and managed care, either 
in the form of fee for service primary care case management, or risk based enrollment 
in prepaid health plans or health maintenance organizations. Both special interest 
groups and median voter variables are shown to have significant explanatory power in 
the adoption of these alternative payment mechanisms.
The third essay uses a system of six equations to examine the relative effects 
of direct and market driven cost containment policies, relating to the general inpatient 
hospital component of Medicaid. Direct cost containment policies, consisting of 
diagnosis related groups prospective payment systems and rate-of-increase control
ix
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based prospective payment systems are found to be effective. To a lesser extend. 
Managed care principles also generate savings. Furthermore, significant substitute 
and complementary relationships between program components emphasize the 
importance of system-wide analysis.
x
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Health care is one of the fastest growing industries in our economy. Both private 
and public health care expenditures have grown substantially since World War n, and 
particularly since the latter half of the 1960s when the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
were established. This dissertation consists of three essays concerning Medicaid 
expenditures. The issue that binds these three essays is reimbursement to providers 
participating in the Medicaid program.
States have traditionally had substantial autonomy regarding the administration of 
their Medicaid programs. This freedom encompasses eligibility criteria, the types and 
scopes of services offered, and rates and methods of reimbursement. This flexibility 
enjoyed by states has resulted in substantial variety between programs with important 
implications regarding the treatment of the poor. To the extent that state level factors 
result in differences in services covered, discrepancies may be expected in the medical 
treatment of the nation’s poor across states.
The first essay focuses on the pharmaceutical drug component of Medicaid. The 
principal thesis of this essay is that the variation in reimbursement rates of the two main 
components of the prescription drug price is primarily the result of the relative strengths 
of interest groups. A secondary hypothesis discussed in this essay is that interest groups 
have an indirect impact on pharmaceutical drug expenditure levels as well. The second 
essay provides an analysis of the reasons why states have adopted certain cost 
containment policies relating to the inpatient hospital component of Medicaid. These 
cost containment policies often take the form of alternatives to the traditional fee for
l
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service reimbursement methodologies, such as prospective payment mechanisms or 
managed care principles. The relative strengths of interest groups and the preferences of 
the median voter are hypothesized to determine the probability of a state adopting these 
alternative reimbursement systems. The third essay is an extension o f the second, 
analyzing the relative effectiveness of the cost containment mechanisms employed by 
states. These costs containment systems include direct control over prices and utilization, 
market driven managed care, and indirect control through the manipulation of eligibility 
standards.
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CHAPTER n
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIATION IN REIMBURSEMENT RATES OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS UNDER MEDICAID
I have no great faith in political arithmetic.
Adam Smith (1776)
SECTION II.I: INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequently debated issues in the government is the upward 
spiraling cost of healthcare entitlement programs. All parties involved commonly agree 
that reducing the growth rates, if not the absolute sizes, of the programs is essential.
Some have argued for relinquishing control over these programs to the individual states. 
To better evaluate this debate and the consequences of suggested solutions to the cost 
problem, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of the driving forces behind 
expenditure patterns. States have traditionally been given extensive autonomy regarding 
the logistics of one of these entitlement programs, particularly Medicaid. This makes it 
an ideal vehicle for analyzing the impact of transferring control over entitlement 
programs from the federal to the state level.
One component of Medicaid expenditures, which has received increased attention 
in recent years, involves the reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs. Although 
reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs is not required under Medicaid law, all state 
Medicaid programs provide some prescription drug benefits. Real national 
pharmaceutical drug expenditures as a component of Medicaid more than doubled from 
1985 to 1994, increasing from $2,031 million to $4,177million, claiming approximately 
seven percent of total expenditures of the program.1
3
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Figure 2.1 : Break down of the selling price of a pharmaceutical drug.
Source : Francis A. Marino, Principles of Pharmaceutical Accounting. Henry Kimpton 
Publishers, London, 1980.
The main focus of this paper is the reimbursement of prescription drugs covered 
under the Medicaid program. The starting point for the analysis is the selling price of 
prescription drugs, which can be broken down into an ingredients cost component, also 
referred to as the pharmacist's acquisition cost, and a dispensing fee component. The 
dispensing fee, in turn, is divided into dispensing cost and a net profit; acquisition and 
dispensing costs constitute the break-even cost for the pharmacist (see Figure 2.1).
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Ingredient costs and dispensing fees are reimbursed by state Medicaid programs through 
separate procedures. These components will be discussed in more detail in section I .n .
Although little variation is observed across states, particularly in the average 
ingredient costs per prescription, substantial differences exists in the level of 
reimbursement of Medicaid prescription drugs. A cursory examination of descriptive 
statistics, albeit not conclusive, provides some evidence. The mean estimated ingredient 
cost per drug for 1991 was calculated at $18.16 with a standard deviation of 1.77 (the 
standard deviation drops to 1.19 when one outlying observation was removed)2. In 
contrast, the mean percentage markup (see Section n.B) for that year was 7.35% with a 
standard deviation of 3.44. A similar, but less conspicuous pattern was found when 
comparing the estimated dispensing costs and fees for that year. One goal of this paper is 
to explain this variation, a good understanding of which is crucial for the construction of 
effective and efficient cost-control legislation.
Federal, and more importantly, state Medicaid policies play an important role in 
the level of prescription drug expenditures. During the past two decades state 
governments have attempted to reduce the growth rate of Medicaid drug expenditures 
through several different cost containment programs, such as Drug Formularies, 
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) Drug Reimbursement Regulations, and Drug 
Utilization Review programs. Cone and Dranove (1986) and Moore and Newman (1993) 
have shown that the economic theory of regulation, developed by Gary S. Becker and 
George J. Stigler, plays a important role in the enactment of these policies across states. 
One hypothesis of this research is that special interest groups play a significant role in 
determining the level of reimbursement of the dispensing and ingredient costs of drugs
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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covered by the Medicaid program. The level of reimbursement for pharmaceutical drugs 
under Medicaid is particularly important to special interest groups considering that other 
third party payers may base their payment policies on those of their own states. In 
addition to special interest variables, the model includes variables representing the 
public's interest and variables accounting for structural differences between states' 
pharmaceutical industries and economies.
Pertaining to prescription chug reimbursement levels three endogenous variables 
will be investigated: (1) dispensing fees, (2) the percentage markup on ingredient costs, 
and (3) the sum of these two components. The state dispensing fee and the percentage 
markup both represent sources of profit to pharmacists. The sum of these components 
provides an estimate o f total profits received by pharmacists for prescription chugs 
covered under Medicaid. Notice that this estimate exaggerates profits since it includes 
dispensing costs. However, dispensing costs constitute a reasonably fixed percentage of 
the fee and should, therefore, not affect the observed variation which this paper attempts 
to explain. The second section of this paper consists of a discussion of the dependent and 
explanatory variables included in these equations.
Next, the dispensing fees and percentage markup will be considered in the 
framework of a larger model designed to explain the variation in states’ Medicaid 
prescription drug expenditures. An additional endogenous variable included in the 
model is the number o f Medicaid recipients in the state. The state Medicaid prescription 
drug expenditure model and the state Medicaid recipients model will be discussed in 
section three. Section four contains a description of the data and the methods used for 
estimation. Section five discusses the results.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7
SECTION H.H: THE DISPENSING FEE AND PERCENTAGE MARKUP 
The Dispensing Fee
The dispensing fee covers pharmacists for expenses incurred only through 
operations in their drug prescription department, accounting for such activities as 
labeling, filling, and drug counseling; additionally, the dispensing fee includes a net 
profit.
Dispensing fee = (Cost of dispensing) + k  (2.1)
Medicaid reimbursement of dispensing fees can be based on either a fixed fee or variable 
fee structure. The fixed fee method, used by the majority of states, provides an identical 
dispensing fee to all participating pharmacists (Table 2.1). Disadvantages of this method 
include overpayment to pharmacists who have a low per-unit dispensing cost, or 
underpayment to pharmacists who have relatively high costs regardless of quality and 
efficiency of services rendered. Furthermore, ignoring efficiency may have adverse 
effects on cost containment incentives. Finally, this method fails to adjust for differences 
which are due to, for example geographic locations (rural versus metropolitan.3), or type 
of ownership (chain versus family pharmacists).
Alternatively, some states have adopted a variable fee approach attempting to 
account for the deficiencies of the fixed fee method (Table 2.1). While this process 
appears more efficient, it is associated with substantial costs of monitoring and 
verification of accuracy of the data. Within this approach, one can distinguish between 
the individual variable fee reimbursement which is based on the costs of operation of 
individual pharmacists (adjusting for such concepts as overhead cost, location, and
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
s
volume), and the categorically variable fees which distinguishes pharmacists according to 
their location, type of ownership, and type of pharmacy.
Table 2.1 : Dispensing fees for 1994 by state and method.
IR hdd^hahd,. 3.40
AlatMiTia  ̂ ~ ^  >  ::'"' $5.40 iSbutfrCSrolina 4.05
Arizona,:. .. ... • 7"' ... 2.50 fSou&Diakota 4.75
Arkansas .J  . l 4.51 + .103EAC iTerinesseer. 3.91
California 4.05 •Texas " 6.30
Colorado 4.08 : Vermont 4.25
Connecticut 4.10 .'Virginia 4.40
Delaware 3.65 W estVugfnia:.. • .• • .... 2.75
D C . 4.50 iXPynirimK- ' T ' " • 4.70
Florida 4.23
Georgia 4.41 •Alaska?' - ''..' 3.45-11.46
Hawaii 4.67 Idaho * 4.41 / 5.38
Illinois 3.58 Iowa 4.02 - 6.25
Indiana 4.00 Kansas 3.59 - 4.82
Louisiana 5.77 Kentucky 4.75 - 5.75
Massachusetts 3.00 Maine 3.35 - 5.35
Michigan. 3.72 Maryland 4.66 / 7.70
Minnesota 3.85 Montana 2.00 - 4.08
Mississippi 4.91 Nebraska: 2.84 - 5.05
Missouri 4.09 New Hampshire 3.25-4.15
Nevada 4.64 New Jersey 3.73 - 4.07
New Mexico 4.00 New York 4.50 - 5.50
North Carolina 5.60 Oregon 3.67 - 4.02
North Dakota 4.50 Utah. . 3.90 - 4.40
Ohio 3.50 Washington v > \  ; • 3.65 - 4.50
Oklahoma * 5.10 W isconsin 4.69 - 6.67
Pennsylvania 3.50
Source : National Pharmaceutical Council. 
Assistance Programs, 1994 and 1995.
Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical
The Ingredient Reimbursement Basis And Percentage Markup
The ingredient reimbursement can be obtained using information regarding the 
actual acquisition cost (AAC), the average wholesale price (AWP), or the wholesale 
acquisition cost (WAC). Considering the high cost of acquiring reliable data to calculate 
the AAC, states have used the latter two methods to estimate acquisition costs as an
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alternative. However, neither the AWP nor the WAC represent an accurate or direct 
measure of actual acquisition costs.
Ordinarily, the AWP is an average representing the suggested wholesale price to 
the pharmacy, and does not account for discounts which the pharmacist may obtain (for 
example through large quantity or direct purchases). Considering these discounts, which 
have been estimated to range from 10 to 18 percent4, averaging at 16, states customarily 
deduct an estimated percentage, £>,. from the AWP to determine the level of 
reimbursement. On average,
The remaining difference between the rate at which states reimburse pharmacists and the 
AAC represents a second source of profits for the pharmacist and is called the percentage 
markup in this paper. The percentage markup associated with this method, is calculated 
as
For example, referring to Table 2.2, for Alaska, Dx = 5%, implying an estimated 
percentage markup of 11%>.
On the other hand, for states which use the WAC measure the percentage markup 
is calculated as follows. Wholesalers generally add an estimated 3.39 percent to the 
wholesale acquisition cost to derive the price of prescription drugs which they charge to 
pharmacists. Thus, to pharmacists
AAC = AWP -16% (2 .2 )
%>MARKUP = 16%- a (2.3)
AAC = WAC + 3.39%. (2.4)
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Table 2.2: States and methods used to obtain the Ingredient Reimbursement Basis in 1994
WAC+9.2% AWP - 10%
AWP - 5% AWP-8.71% /W AC+12.52%
EAC AWP - 10%
^akansas V: ; - AWP - 10.5% IFleevlHanipsfmK AWP -10%
California AWP - 5% iNeBpJersor AWP - 0/6%
: Colorado AWP - 10 / WAC + 18% NewM exicb AWP -10.5%
^Connecticut. AWP - 8% AWP
'Delaware AAC (=AWP) AWP - 10%
D.C. AWP - 10% iNortEDakota^ AWP -10%
Florida. WAC + 7% v<ohio '̂̂ rs, - . AWP - 7%
Georgia AWP - 10% 'OBfficnha:' ' ' '• ‘ AWP - 10.5%
Hawaii AWP - 10.5% Oregon AWP - 11%
Idaho AWP Pennsylvania AWP
Illinois AWP - 10% Rhode Island AWP
Indiana AWP - 10% South.Carolina AWP - 9.5%
Iowa : AWP -10% SouflfeDakota AWP - 10.5%
.Kansas, : AWP - 10% ^ T en n essee ::
Kentucky AWP - 10% Texaa AWP - 1 0.49%/WAC+12%
Louisiana AWP - 10.5% Utah AWP - 12%
Maine EAC/AWP - 5% Vermont AWP - 10%
Maryland WAC + 10% Virginia AWP - 9%
Massachusetts WAC + 10% Washington AWP - 11%
Michigan AWP - 10% /AAC Wek»Virginia. : . AWP
Minnesota AWP -  7.6% W£consm:;.v :• 7 AWP - 10%
Mississippi AWP -  10% W yom ing-./ AWP - 4%
Missouri AWP -  10.43%
Source : National Pharmaceutical Council. Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical 
Assistance Programs, 1995.
Medicaid reimbursement of prescription drugs adds a percentage markup to the WAC, say 
M x. Thus, pharmacists get an ingredient reimbursement (IR) equal to
IR = WAC + M x (2.5)
Using (2.4) and (2.5), the percentage markup enjoyed by pharmacists under this method, 
IR - AAC, is
%MARKUP = M x-3.39%. (2.6)
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Accordingly, for Florida (Table 2.2) M x = 7%, yielding a percentage markup o f 2.61%. 
Table 2.2 contains a list of states and the methods they employed in 1994 to obtain the 
ingredient reimbursement basis.
Explanatory Variables
Public and special interest variables
There are two opposing theories explaining the enactment of legislation regarding 
the delivery of medical services, or, within the context of this paper, the reimbursement of 
pharmaceutical drug expenditures through states' Medicaid policies. The “political” or 
“public interest” theory assumes that legislation is passed by policy makers based solely 
on benevolence and altruism directed toward greater equity in the delivery of Medicaid.
In contrast, according to the economic theory of regulation, industries or special interest 
groups acquire or solicit regulation from the state which is designed and operated for their 
benefit.5 The ability of an interest group to obtain benefits through legislation is affected 
by the underlying structure of the interest group, the political process, and the interaction 
of competing groups both with each other and the legislature. Groups which are more 
easily organized and whose members are affected more directly and expect to acquire 
greater gains or losses (ceteris paribus), as a result of legislation, are likely to allocate 
more resources toward influencing the political process. The benefit or cost to a policy 
maker of voting for a particular legislation is expressed in terms of political support or 
loss, through votes, campaign contributions, or volunteer time, from groups whom are 
affected by that legislation.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Thus, there are two groups of policy related variables which are expected to affect 
the level of reimbursement of prescription drugs through Medicaid policy. The first 
group of explanatory variables is associated with the public interest theory of legislation.
1. The state’s budget surplus. Cone and Dranove (1986) argue that a state's incentive 
to implement cost containment policies is a product of the political cost of taxation, 
expressed in terms of the state's relative budget deficit.6 Budget deficits are expected 
to have a positive impact on a state’s willingness to enact cost containment policies. 
Similarly, the cost of taxation is expected to have a negative effect on reimbursement 
of Medicaid drugs; states with low or negative budget surpluses are expected to 
provide lower reimbursement rates. The state's relative budget surplus is defined as,
„ . state revenue - state expendituresRelative Budget Surplus = ---------------------------   .
state revenue
2. The state’s per recipient Medicaid drug expenditure. The budgetary burden 
attributable to the state's Medicaid drug expenditures is also expected to affect 
reimbursement levels.7 A higher budgetary burden in the previous year is 
hypothesized to generate political pressure to limit related expenditures. The first 
variable considered in this context is the state's per recipient Medicaid drug 
expenditures from the previous year, calculated as total state Medicaid drug 
expenditures divided by the number of Medicaid drug recipients in the state, i.e.
_ _ .. state medicaid drug expendituresPer Recipient Drug Expenditures = ----------------------  — ------------- .
state medicaid drug recipients
3. The share of the state’s Medicaid budget allocated to prescription drugs. The
next variable measuring the state’s budgetary burden related to Medicaid prescription
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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drug reimbursement is the share of the state's Medicaid budget allocated to
prescription drug expenditures in the previous year, defined as
w  j - j o, State Medicaid Drug Expenditues Medicaid Drug Share = ------------------------ 2---- ------------ .
State Medicaid Expenditures
Pertaining to the economic theory of legislation, the interest groups which are 
most likely to be affected by state legislation on Medicaid reimbursement of drag 
expenditures are those related to recipients, pharmacists, physicians, and drug 
manufacturers.
1. The number of Medicaid recipients relative to the state's population. The first of 
the interest groups considered is the recipient group. The number of overall Medicaid 
recipients relative to the state’s population is used to measure the influence of this 
group,
~ , •  State Medicaid RecipientsMedicaid Recipients Relative to Population = ------------------------- --------.
State Population
Recipients are expected to favor higher reimbursement rates, which may encourage 
higher numbers of providers to participate in the program, implying better access to 
covered services. Furthermore, higher reimbursement rates may translate into more 
time and attention devoted to each recipient.8 However, the political influence of this 
group is not expected to be significant. Low income and less educated groups have 
historically had marginal participation in the voting process. Furthermore, many low 
income families go through spells of eligibility which last only a few months to a 
year. Thus, eligibility for Medicaid tends to be transitory, a characteristic which is not 
very conducive to organization and political recognition of this group.9
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2. The American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA). Higher reimbursements 
would, by definition, result in a higher net profit per drug for pharmacists. Therefore, 
the pharmaceutical lobbying group, the American Pharmaceutical Association 
(APhA), is expected to support higher reimbursement rates. Because of an absence of 
data on political contributions made by the APhA, the percentage of pharmacists 
belonging to the APhA, is used to capture the influence of this interest group.
3. Physician interests. What about physician interest groups? Unlike drug expenditure 
containment policies which are aimed, for example, at reducing the range of available 
drugs, such as formularies, drug reimbursement policies do not affect this group 
directly. Nonetheless, they are expected to have a preference regarding different cost 
containment measures; particularly, physicians favor policies which do not affect their 
freedom to prescribe the most appropriate drug to an individual patient. Physicians 
are therefore expected to have an incentive to support lower Medicaid drug 
reimbursement rates over other drug expenditure containment policies. Due to the 
lack of data on the lobbying activities and political contributions of this group, the 
number of physicians belonging to the American Medical Association is utilized to 
capture its influence.10
4. The drug manufacturing industry. The drug manufacturing industry is affected 
only indirectly by reimbursement levels. Containment of the Medicaid budget has 
been on the foreground of the political debate for more than a decade, particularly at 
the state level. Knowing this, related interest groups will support cost cutting that 
affects their counterparts, with the goal of protecting their own revenues.
Accordingly, this group is expected to support a lower level of reimbursement for
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both the dispensing and ingredient costs. The more states save by reducing dispensing 
fees and the markup, the smaller will be the effort to enact legislation which will 
adversely affect the drug manufacturing industry. On the other hand, cooperative 
relationships may exist between this group and pharmacists, creating some ambiguity 
regarding their motivations and influences.
To measure the drug manufacturing industry’s influence its relative concentration as 
an employer is used. The data used here falls under the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry number 2834, which includes * establishments primarily 
engaged in manufacturing, fabricating, or processing drugs in pharmaceutical 
preparations for human or veterinary use. The greater part of the products of these 
establishments are finished in the form intended for final consumption.. The 
higher the employment in the drug manufacturing industry the greater its lobbying 
power. Relative employment in the drug manufacturing industry is calculated as
employment in drug manufacturing 
state labor force
Other explanatory variables
As discussed earlier, pharmacists ordinarily obtain drugs from manufacturers at 
discounts ranging from 10 to 18 percent. It is reasonable to assume that bigger chain 
pharmacists with their larger prescription volumes can earn the most discounts through 
quantity purchases. Furthermore, such chains can achieve economies of scale as a result 
of their own warehousing operations. These advantages which are inherent of this subset 
of pharmaceutical companies suggests that the structure of the industry within states may 
effect Medicaid drug reimbursement legislation. Particularly, states with pharmaceutical
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industries consisting of mainly chain pharmacists, each controlling large volumes of 
prescription drugs, may compensate for the greater discounts with lower ingredient 
acquisition cost estimates and dispensing fees. To capture the significance of the industry 
structure, the percentage of chain pharmacists in a state is included in the regression. The 
percentage of chain pharmacists is calculated as
n . n1 number chain pharmacistsPercentage of Cham Pharmacists = ----------------------------------   .
number of chain + number of community pharmacists
A negative sign is expected for this variable.
Furthermore, the state's per capita personal income is included in the model to
proxy the state's willingness and ability to pay for Medicaid services. Higher per capita
income (PCY) generally provides more resources for state programs and is expected to
have a positive effect. Table 2.3 contains a list of variables used in this part of the
analysis.
SECTION II.III: STATE MEDICAID RECIPIENTS AND STATE MEDICAID 
DRUG EXPENDITURES
State Medicaid Recipients
States have traditionally had extensive autonomy in shaping their Medicaid 
programs.12 Eligibility requirements for Medicaid assistance, and therefore the number of 
recipients of Medicaid services, is determined within each state, for example by 
manipulating income standards, income disregards, resource standards, definitions of 
disability, or any combination of these factors. The number of Medicaid recipients in the 
state is therefore considered to be endogenously determined.13
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
17
Table 2.3: Listing of explanatory variables.
The dispensing fee.
The percentage markup._____________ ______________________________
The total reimbursement.___________________________________________
Publiclhtegest variables
The state's budget surplus, representing the political cost of taxation_______
The state's per recipient Medicaid drug expenditures____________________
The share of the state’s Medicaid budget allocated to drug expenditures 
Specfalimter&£va^ ,,, ^
The number of Medicaid recipients relative to the state's population________
The number of pharmacists belonging to the American Pharmaceutical
Association______________________________________________________
The number of physicians belonging to the American Medical Association 
The number of employees in the pharmaceutical drug manufacturing industry
relative to the state’s labor force._____________________________________
State and industry structure variables
The percentage of chain pharmacists in the state________________________
Per capita personal income
Median voter variables
Following Moore et al. and Wade et al., a median voter model is employed to 
explain the variation in the number of Medicaid recipients per state. According to this 
model taxpayers derive utility from the consumption of goods and services as well as 
from the transfer of income to welfare recipients. The median voter determines the 
quantity of public goods by maximizing a utility function subject to a budget constraint:
maxU (X ,fV ,Z)s.t.Y  = P X  + P W  (2.7){A' JV}
where X is the quantity of Medicaid services provided and Px is the tax price to the 
median voter of an additional unit of service provided. W represents a composite bundle 
of goods and services, with price Pw, consumed by the median voter, and Z is a set of 
exogenous factors which influence the median voter’s preferences for W or X.
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The following variables are employed in the model to proxy the median voter’s 
preferences for providing Medicaid services:
1. The tax price. The tax price is approximated by the state’s share of Medicaid 
expenditures, derived by subtracting the Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP), thus
Tea Price = (I - FMAP) (2.8)
According to this model the quantity of Medicaid services provided and the tax price are 
inversely related.
2. Per capita income. Per capita income is used to measure the median voter’s 
willingness or ability to provide Medicaid services. This variables is expected to have 
a positive effect on the number of recipients.
3. Welfare share of the state budget. The share of the state’s budget already devoted 
to welfare programs is included to proxy the median voter’s willingness to provide 
services to the poor.
4. Demographic factors. In addition to the tax price and ability to provide, the existing 
literature has hypothesized that voters are generally more willing to support children 
and less willing to help minorities.14 To control for these factors the percentage of 
individuals under the age of 21 covered by the AFDC program, and the percentage of 
the population that is African American are included in the model.
Demand, interest group, and federal policy variables
The number of Medicaid recipients also depends on the current economic 
environment, the activities of interest groups, and federal policies. To control for these 
factors the following variables are included in the model.
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1. Demand variables include the percentage of the population under the poverty line, 
the unemployment rate, and the relative benefits received by recipients. The relative 
benefits received by individuals is approximated by the average payments to AFDC 
families. A positive relationship is expected between these variables and the number 
of Medicaid recipients.
2. Interest groups whose activities are hypothesized to affect the size o f the Medicaid 
population are the hospital and physician groups. The influence of these groups will 
be approximated by the number of hospital beds per capita and the percentage of 
physicians belonging to the American Medical Association.
3. Federal policy variables include a dummy variable indicating years greater than 
1986. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 mandated the 
expansion of Medicaid eligibility to include low-income infants, children, and 
pregnant women.15 A second dummy variable is included for years greater than 1990 
to take the effects of OBRA 1990 into account. New legislation due to OBRA 1990 
include:
• a mandate that all states adopt retrospective and prospective DUR programs 
by 1993.
• prohibition of drug formularies
• requirement of drug manufacturer’s discounts or rebates.
• prohibition of reductions in pharmacy payments for a 3 year period.
4. State dummies are included in this equation to account for the idiosyncrasies of the 
states. At this first level of state control over the size of the program there are likely 
to be substantial unobservable characteristics which may have an impact on
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legislation. After the eligible population has been established the program takes on 
the form of an entitlement, at which point the logistics of the Medicaid program itself 
will largely determine, for example, expenditure levels, while these state unique 
characteristics assume diminished importance. These state dummies will therefore 
not be included in the expenditure equations.
State Medicaid Drug Expenditures
Sections H and LH discussed the variation in reimbursement levels of prescription 
drugs covered under the Medicaid program and the variation in the number of Medicaid 
recipients across states. Dispensing fees, the percentage markup, and the number of 
Medicaid recipients are all expected to affect expenditure directly.
In addition to the level of reimbursement and eligibility criteria, states have 
substantial flexibility in determining which services will be covered, the extent to which 
those services will be covered, and what methods of payment will be used.
Drug expenditure control policy variables
To reduce the growth of Medicaid drug expenditures states have adopted a variety 
of measures, including:
1. Restricted formularies to limit the number of drugs which will be covered by the 
Medicaid program. Following the analysis of Moore and Newman, the effect of 
restricted formularies is accounted for through a dummy variable.16
2. Retrospective drug utilization review programs designed to enhance the quality of 
care by eliminating unnecessary and inappropriate drug therapy.17
3. Drug-copayments which are meant to help finance the costs and reduce over­
utilization of prescription drugs.18
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Non-drug control policy variables
When the coverage of a particular service becomes restricted due to legislative 
action, a needy recipient will attempt to replace it with alternatives which are covered 
under Medicaid. Medicaid recipients by definition have limited disposable income and 
will, therefore, seek out the lowest cost care, i.e. the type of care that is most fully 
covered by the program. For example, if coverage o f effective prescription drugs is 
restricted a patient requiring care may substitute less effective drugs or even alternative 
sources of medical care, such as physician, outpatient clinic, or even emergency room 
services. This implies that a decrease in expenditures caused by restrictions in the 
coverage of that service may have spill over effects into substitute services, causing 
increases in related expenditures.19- :o
On the other hand, some services serve as complements to others. A patient 
acquires prescription drugs through a two step process. The patient first initiates contact 
with a physician who then prescribes the prescription drug if deemed necessary. In this 
sense physician care and prescription drugs are complements, implying a positive 
relationship between physician services and prescription drugs.21' ~
To control for these substitute and complementary relationships a number of non­
drug control policy variables are included in the prescription drug expenditure equation. 
Policies which are aimed at restricting the use of non-drug services may increase or 
decrease prescription drug expenditures depending on whether they are substitutes or 
complements. The following non-drug policy dummy variables, with a value of one if the 
policy is in use, are included: the state
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1. has limits on the coverage of inpatient hospital services.
2. uses Medicare principles, or prospective payment, for the reimbursement of inpatient 
hospital services.
3. has limits on the coverage of outpatient hospital services.
4. uses Medicare principles, or prospective payment, for the reimbursement of outpatient 
hospital services.
5. has limits on the coverage of skilled nursing facility services.
6. has limits on mentally retarded intermediate care facility services.
7. has limits on physicians’ inpatient hospital visits.
8. requires prior authorization for certain physician services.
9. uses Medicare principles to reimburse physician services.
In addition to these nine dummy variables the model also includes real co-payment
(deflated using the all-item CPI) on physician services.
Recipient and state characteristics
Not all age groups have the same demand for health services.
1. The percentage of recipients under age 21. Younger populations ordinarily enjoy 
greater health status, therefore requiring fewer services.
2. The percentage of recipients age 65 and above. In contrast, older populations 
generally have a higher demand for such services, including prescription drugs. 
Furthermore, since long-term care and prescription drugs are not covered under 
Medicare the percentage of the population over 65 years of age is expected to have a 
significant impact on Medicaid prescription drug expenditures. Payments per user for 
the aged were $668 compared to $69 and $148 for children and adults, respectively.23
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State characteristic variables included are the percentage of the population living
in metropolitan areas, per capita pharmacists, and per capita physicians.
1. The percentage of people living in metropolitan areas is included to account for 
any variation that is due to difference in their demand relative to their non­
metropolitan counterparts.
2. Per capita pharmacists and physicians are included to capture the effects of greater 
supply of, and access to, medical services.
Federal policy variables
The role of the federal government in the Medicaid program has been to establish
and regulate a minimum level of benefits. Pertaining to this there have been two major
policy changes during the study period.
1. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987 which, among other legislation, 
expanded Medicaid eligibility.
2. OBRA of 1990 which prohibited the use of drug formularies, required drug 
manufacturers’ discounts or rebates, and prohibited reductions in pharmacy payments 
for a three year period.24
3. Trend variables to account for year to year changes in Medicaid program logistics, 
stemming, for example, from new legislation.
Table 2.4 : Growth rates of recipients of prescription drugs under Medicaid.
AL 1.32 -9.04 7.64 4.41 li08 7.12 15.51 20.02 12.69 3.53 11.77
AR 5.95 -0.43 3.98 7.28 4.20 8.44 7.85 11.59 5.43 0.23 6.71
CA 5.79 4.86 3.34 -3.23 2.69 8.9 12.31 11.01 7.85 5.5 9.11
CO -1.4 11.59 6.18 6.83 5.80 6.75 18.14 18.62 9.58 2.02 11.02
CT -0.66 -0.95 -0.72 3.28 0.24 15.93 9.96 12.84 6.82 6.48 10.41
DE -3.07 -5.24 -3.22 5.45 -1.52 4.79 31.38 14.22 13.01 10.79 14.84
Source: Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082. (Table Con’d.)
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Table 2.4: Continued
FL 4.64 7.03 11.32 10.64 tm 23.23 17.53 30.08 15.02 -4.35 16.30
GA 33.58 5.38 2.42 8.22 12.40 12.92 16.37 18.97 8.82 9.22 13.26
HI -2.26 -1.75 0.62 5.15 0.44 -4.66 8.24 9.36 11.27 10.15 6.87
IA 7.39 4.22 -1.6 -1.2 2.20 9.36 9.56 5.64 2.59 7.95 7.02
ID -6.54 7.19 18.78 4.1 5.88 13.94 28.89 24.23 14.9 12.06 18.80
IL 5.1 -0.55 -1.61 2.08 1.26 2.39 7.57 11.72 5.83 -0.55 5.39
IN 10.58 0.28 2.15 -1.13 2.97 11.02 21.23 23.03 10.46 9.13 14.97
KS -11.8 10.07 23.03 5.68 6.75 9.29 11.04 10.69 8.9 4.47 8.88
KY 4.16 -1.23 1.67 5.2 2.45 10.03 17.86 12.59 5.47 2.27 9.64
LA 7.7 5.64 -10.31 20.73 5.94 14.3 11.69 10.39 6.16 4.54 9.42
MA 2.36 6.13 0.9 3.39 3.20 1.41 12.09 7.8 2.78 2.81 5.38
MD -0.82 -3.43 -1.67 2.61 -0.83 3.96 7.73 10.19 11.67 -4.14 5.88
ME 1.96 -0.25 -0.46 3.37 1.16 8.73 15.49 5.93 3.11 5.79 7.81
MI 1.58 -0.42 -0.03 2.36 0.87 2.09 7.22 1.25 -10.28 16 3.26
MN 1.14 -4.93 -2.28 -3.91 -2.50 25.14 4.06 1.3 5.48 -1.26 6.94
MO 6.29 2.44 4.3 6.7 4.93 0.22 26.6 14.23 13.01 9.98 12.81
MS* 5.56 7.75 5.13 7.25 6.42 7.68 8.32 11.17 3.26 0.66 6.22
MT 13.06 9.7 31.03 -14.55 9.81 0.58 4.1 -7.3 50.96 8.21 11.31
NC 9.3 2.98 7.09 15.69 8.77 12.68 22.09 18.83 13.4 5.1 14.42
ND 10.1 9.76 5.91 5.71 7.87 6.61 6.53 11.39 7.48 0.84 6.57
NE 8.94 5.87 -0.18 3.74 4.59 10.07 14.44 15.36 8.2 0.2 9.65
NH -1.04 -3.31 -0.23 9.33 1.19 20.55 32.18 21.69 14.73 13.67 20.56
NJ -0.99 9.46 -15.24 0.74 -1.51 5.97 8.82 10.41 8.43 0.81 6.89
NM 5.26 6.66 8.76 5.9 6.65 12.99 26.01 18.4 13.34 10.5 16.25
NV 11.49 5.44 6.58 14.23 9.44 17.56 26.17 27.16 8.52 2.04 16.29
NY 20.6 -1.4 -3.3 0.15 4.01 4.42 7.13 4.45 4.86 2.31 4.63
OH 3.03 1.1 -2.92 3.34 1.14 1.95 12 11.56 3.3 -0.65 5.63
OK -10.39 34.98 2.66 6.83 8.52 10.81 15.11 20.65 10.54 -1.59 11.10
OR 3.75 3.46 7.64 14.37 7.31 7.23 -0.1 34.58 7.96 6.77 11.29
PA 1.98 -6.89 -2.03 6.1 -0.21 6.26 12.18 10.05 0.12 5.14 6.75
RI* -2.56 -0.07 0.56 4.81 0.69 14.89 16.31 7.56 18.83 -55.6 0.40
SC 9.23 1.58 -2.35 5.21 3.42 14.49 22.57 16.11 8.8 4.1 13.21
SD 6.99 14.85 4.44 8.3 8.65 9.16 17.03 15.06 6.97 6.53 10.95
TN* 5.93 15.11 9.49 13.35 10.97 12.39 15.19 14.16 15.23 -35.2 4.35
TX 13.19 11.51 7.57 10.72 10.75 20.49 21.71 20.72 14.17 7.93 17.00
UT 7.82 9.53 7 8.36 8.18 15.14 17.78 16.35 8.73 7.67 13.13
VA 3.53 0.54 2.04 7.2 3.33 8.52 17.62 17.81 12.53 9.38 13.17
VT 0.22 2.29 3.87 5.43 2.95 11.9 16.84 9.17 6.57 17.28 12.35
WA 10.47 10.34 4.33 7.23 8.09 8.61 14.25 12.95 10.37 2.21 9.68
WI -8.71 2.13 0.38 -2.17 -2.09 3.1 5.58 5.87 7.01 0.47 4.41
WV 8.12 6.37 2.09 13.7 7.57 2.24 18.64 11.04 10.08 4.78 9.36
M m m m mm m m w m m s m m m
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SECTION O.IV: DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS
Data was collected for 47 states (see Table 2.1) covering a period of 10 years from 
1985 to 1994, adding up to a total of 470 observations. Social-economic data was 
obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Medicaid prescription drug 
policy specific data was compiled from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical 
Assistance Programs publication by the National Pharmaceutical council. Additional 
Medicaid specific statistics were acquired from publications of the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA), including the internet site www.hcfa.gov.com. Other data 
sources include the County Business Patterns, and data collected by Professor Moore.25. 
The unit of analysis is the State. Missing observations for APhA membership and AMA 
membership were extrapolated using averages from previous and following years. 
Structural Breaks in the Data
Since its creation, the Medicaid program, and in particular cost containment, has 
been subject to ongoing changes in the legislative process. Not surprisingly, F-tests for 
structural breaks revealed that the parameter vector is not the same throughout the sample 
period.26 Consequently, the data had to be divided into two five year segments.
Subsequent F-tests indicate that the data can be grouped into two five year blocks, 
ranging from 1985-1989 and 1990-1994.
The break in the parameter vector coincides with extensive activity in the political 
arena, regarding the Medicaid program. OBRA 1987 and 1989, for example mandated 
eligibility expansions to include pregnant women and children up to age six with incomes 
below 133 of the federal poverty level. The growth rates of prescription drug recipients 
are shown in Table 2.4. With the exception of Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Tennessee,
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all states experienced a substantial increase in the growth of prescription drug recipients. 
Rhode Island and Tennessee also had higher growth rates from 1989 - 1993, but 
experienced a substantial drop between 1993 and 1994.
As discussed earlier, OBRA 1990 also included several new legislative measures 
relating to prescription drug coverage under Medicaid. Furthermore, there is a noticeable 
increase in the number of states adopting ingredient markup adjustment policies between 
1989 and 1990, perhaps in anticipation of OBRA 1990. Table 2.5 lists the years during 
which the 47 states included in the sample adopted such adjustment measures, indicating 
that the number of states using such measures increased dramatically from 20 (43 
percent) to 39 (83 percent) in 1990.
Table 2.5 : Years in which states in the sample made adjustments in the ingredient 
reimbursement basis.
Alabama Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 87
Arkansas Y Y Y Y Y 90
California Y Y Y Y Y 90
Colorado Y Y Y Y Y 90
Connecticut Y Y Y Y Y Y 89
Delaware Y Y Y 90
Florida Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 87
Georgia Y Y Y Y Y Y 89
Hawaii Y Y Y Y Y Y 89
Idaho
Illinois Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 88
Indiana Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 85
Iowa Y Y* Y Y Y Y Y Y 87
Kansas Y Y Y Y Y 90
Kentucky Y Y Y Y Y 90
Louisiana Y Y Y Y Y Y 89
Maine Y Y Y Y* . Y Y Y Y Y 85
Maryland Y Y Y Y Y 90
Massachusetts Y Y Y Y Y Y 89
Michigan; " Y* Y Y Y Y Y 88
Minnesota Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 85
Source : Pharmaceutical 
which made adjustments
Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs, 
on selected drugs only. (Table Con’d.)
♦States
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Table 2.5: Continued
Y Y Y Y Y 90
, . Y Y Y Y 91
Y* Y Y Y Y Y Y 88
Y* Y Y Y Y Y Y 88
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 85
NewHampsfaire Y Y Y Y Y 90
New Jersey Y Y Y* Y* Y Y Y Y Y 80
.NewMexico Y Y Y Y Y Y 89
•’NeifcYdrfc . Y 94
Northearolina . Y Y Y Y Y 90
North Dakota:.. Y Y Y Y 91
. Ohio Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 85
Oklahoma . Y Y Y Y Y 90
‘Oregon:. Y Y Y Y Y 90
Pennsylvania . .
Jthodelslahd Y 94
South Carolina Y Y Y Y* Y Y Y Y Y Y 85
South Dakota: Y Y Y* Y Y Y Y Y Y 86
Tennessee Y Y Y Y Y # 88
Texas Y* Y* Y* Y Y Y Y Y 87
Utah Y Y* Y Y Y Y Y Y 87
Vermont Y Y Y Y Y 90
Virginia Y Y Y Y 91
Washington Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 85
West Virginia . 9
Wisconsin Y Y Y Y Y 90
Total 8 9 14 18 20 39 42 42 40 41
Source : Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs.
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Estimation Procedures
There are five endogenous variables for each five year period, the dispensing fee, 
the percentage markup, the estimated total profit, the number of Medicaid recipients, and 
prescription drug expenditures. The independent variables may be grouped into nine 
categories (Table 2.6).
The dispensing fee, percentage markup, Medicaid recipients, and drug 
expenditure equations were estimated using a simultaneous equations iterative three stage 
least squares (3SLS) approach. The model estimated for each five year period is as 
follows:
y t =/3m+’t p P A , + i , l G f i „ + f ISC/3,l + sl
1=1 l =4 1=8
*  =fiK + t , Pp-fi.'.+ i . IG-’A :  + t , SC'Pr. +£:
1 = 1  1=4 1=8
5 8 10 12
y>=f i«3*'EM V ^ +2 D ^ +' L I G ^ + ' Z ! G ^ +s!
i=l 1=6 i= 9  i= l l
T4 = y\Y 14 + T:/24 + V3/34 + 'Z  DC • #4 + Z  RC • #4 + Z  NDC ' #4 + £  'FP ’ /?,4 + ̂ 5
i=l i=4 i=6 117 1
(2.9)
Where y, is the dispensing fee, >\ is the percentage markup, y 3 is the number of Medicaid 
recipients, and y, is the natural logarithm of pharmaceutical drug expenditures. The 3SLS 
approach accounts for the information that may be embedded in the error covariances 
e \e,£j ] = cr,j I  for / * j ,  between the i* and equations.27 Since the dependent variables
in the model are determined within the same system, it is reasonable to assume nonzero 
“contemporaneous’'’ covariances between the equations’ disturbance terms. Furthermore,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
29
since the equations are over-identified, 3SLS will increase the efficiency of the 
estimation.
To test whether this more technical estimation method produced more efficient
estimates, hypothesis tests were conducted of the form
Hq : <xi; = 0 vs.
//, : at least one <jt/ * 0.
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests were executed both jointly and individually to test 
whether the covariances between equations were significantly different from zero. The 
LM statistic has a ^  distribution under the null-hypothesis, where (p) represents the
number of hypotheses being tested. The joint hypothesis test yielded a value of 31.466, 
testing the hypothesis, H0 : crl2 = 0; crl3 = 0; crI4 = 0; or23 = 0; cr,4 = 0;a u  =0 against the 
alternative that at least one covariance is non-zero in the first period. The subscripts 
represent, respectively, the prescription drug expenditure, dispensing fee, percentage 
markup, and Medicaid recipients equations. The critical value of a chi-square distribution 
with six degrees of freedom at the (a = 0.01) level is 16.81. The null-hypothesis is 
therefore rejected in favor of the alternative. This result holds for the second period as 
well. An individual hypothesis of particular interest examined the covariance of the 
residuals of the dispensing fee and percentage markup equations, H0 : ov, = 0. The LM
test again led to the rejection of the null-hypothesis in favor of the alternative in both 
periods of the analysis. These results indicate substantial gains in efficiency of the 3SLS 
method over OLS pertaining to the data used in this study.
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Furthermore, there exists adequate evidence in the existing literature that the level 
of dispensing fees and the percentage markup are systematically related.28 States which 
reimburse the dispensing fee at high rates tend to support lower percentage markups on 
ingredient costs, perhaps to achieve a balance. The simple correlation coefficient 
between these two variables is (-0.52686) and statistically significant at the (a  = 0.01) 
level. Given the above discussed reasons, the reimbursement levels for dispensing fees 
and the percentage markup are assumed to be jointly determined. Simultaneous 
equations estimation should therefore yield superior results over a single equations 
approach.
In a separate model the sum of the dispensing fee (as a percentage) and the 
percentage markup, calculated as
SUM = —DisPensing fee— + percentage markup (2.10)
Average drug price
is considered. Two equations are estimated here using an iterative seemingly unrelated 
regressions model:
S U M ^  = .P P • /?„ +  £  IG  • 0 n +  X  S C ' Pn  +
/=! i=4 /=8
S U M ^  = f i 02+ f dP P -  0 l2 + ' £ l G / 3 l Z + £ S C -  f i , 2 +  s .
(2 . 11)
Before proceeding with the estimation the equations were also examined for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The diagnostics revealed that the former problem 
is present in the data. The variances appear to be related to the size of the health care 
market in the states. To account for this each equation in the system is first corrected 
using the multiplicative heteroskedasticity model.29 Subsequent diagnostics, examining
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the 2SLS residuals, were used to verify that the problem had been removed. A 
comparison of the 3SLS results from this analysis and OLS results indicate that the latter 
method may either underestimate or overestimate the significance of certain factors. 
SECTION H.V: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Dispensing Fee, Percentage Markup. And Total Profit Equations
The results for the 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 periods are shown in Tables 1.7 (a- 
c) and 1.8 (a-c), respectively.
Public interest variables
The estimated coefficients associated with the public interest variables are 
generally statistically insignificant and do not carry consistent signs. In this analysis, no 
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that the states’ political cost of taxation 
determines the reimbursement levels of dispensing fees and ingredient component 
markups of pharmacists’ production.
1. The state’s relative budget surplus has a positive and significant impact on total profit 
during the 1985-1989 period, but is not significant in all other equations.
2. Per recipient Medicaid drug expenditures of the previous year is not statistically 
significant in the total profit equation of the first period. Also, contrary to 
expectations, the estimated coefficients for the component equations indicate a 
positive relationship. For the second period the estimated coefficients are all negative 
in the dispensing fee and total profit equations as predicted. This may be an 
indication of mounting pressures to contain prescription drug expenditures over time.
3. The share of the state’s Medicaid budget allocated to prescription drugs in the 
previous period also does not perform well. Contrary to expectation the impact of
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this variable appears to be positive and significant in the dispensing fee equations. In 
the percentage markup equations it does carry a negative sign but is significant only in 
the second period.
The special interest variables
The special interest variables perform better and have significantly more 
explanatory power. With the exception of the Medicaid recipients, the special interest 
groups generally have a statistically significant influence on the three dependent 
variables.
1. Medicaid recipients as a percentage of the state population has a positive and 
significant impact on the percentage markup in both periods of the analysis.
However, contrary to expectation the impact of this variable is negative and 
significant in the dispensing fee equations of both periods. The impact on total profit 
is not statistically significant. This lack of consistency and significance may be due to 
the limited political power and organization that is inherent to this group.
2. The percentage of pharmacists who are members of the APhA was expected to have a 
positive impact on reimbursement levels. Accordingly, a strong positive and 
statistically significant impact is observed in both the component equations as well as 
in the total profit equations. These results suggest that the APhA has been successful 
in protecting their members’ interests.
3. The percentage of physicians belonging to the AMA has the expected negative impact 
particularly in the second period. An anomalous positive and significant coefficient 
was found for the dispensing fee equation in the first period.
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4. The percentage of the labor force employed by the drug manufacturing industry does 
not have a consistent impact. In the first period it is not significant in any of the 
equations. In contrast, in the second period it has a positive and significant impact on 
the percentage markup component.
Other explanatory variables
1. The percentage of chain pharmacists in the state has a consistent, predicted, negative, 
and generally statistically significant influence on all three dependent variables. This 
indicates that states have been successful in accounting for the lower average cost 
enjoyed by chain pharmacists. The only deviation from this pattern was observed in 
the percentage markup equations where the impact was not significant at the 
(a = 0.05) level.
2. The states' per capita income was predicted to have a positive impact on the 
willingness and ability to support higher reimbursement rates. Larger per capita 
income presumably implies increased ability and willingness to support higher 
payment levels. The results obtained here do not confirm this hypothesis. An 
explanation for this may lie in the structure of the Medicaid program which is a joint 
federal-state contract.30 The states’ share of incurred expenditures is calculated as
State Per Capita Personal IncomeStateShare = x 0.45. (2.12)
National Per Capita Personal Income 
A state’s share of expenditures is thus directly related to its per capita income. 
Therefore, states with a higher per capita income pay a larger share o f the incurred 
expenditures and thus have an incentive to limit reimbursement levels.
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Table 2.7a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable:
Dispensing Fee (1985-1989)._________________________________________
2.4852 0.2557 9.72 0.0001
0 . 2 8 0 9 0 . 3 6 8 8 0 . 7 6 0 . 4 4 7 1
Perrecirn^xfira^e^r^j&uiies . 0.0018 0.0009 2.06 0.0410
4.5943 1.4840 3.10 0.0022
-0.0049 0.0011 -4.48 0.0001
0.0072 0.0023 3.13 0.0020
0.0040 0.0018 2.26 0.0249
Tfciginam^^ - 0 . 0 3 4 1 0 . 0 2 0 7 - 1 . 6 5 0 . 1 0 1 0
Percentage cba&pharmac&ts -0.0103 0.0024 -4.27 0.0001
Per capita income 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 7 3 0 . 0 8 5 6
Estimates significant at the five percent leve are in boldfaced print.
Table 2.7b: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: 
Percentage Markup (1985-1989).
H H B S 9 H
Constant 16.5551 3.1308 5.29 0.0001
Relative budgetsurplus - 0  . 18 17 4 . 4 0 4 4 -0  . 0 4 0 . 9 6 7 1
Berrecipientdrugexpenthtures 0.0241 0.0089 2.7 0.0075
Driigsfiare^ - 2 4  . 5 2 6 7 1 5 . 4 9 1 8 1 F-* tn 03 0 . 1 1 4 8
Medicaid;fec$«n@ ^pa^(m^ 0.0279 0.0129 2.16 0.0322
Percerit^ei®^ihCTi«rafilpJ:i; 0.0835 0.0294 2.84 0.0049
Percentage AMA membership -0.0468 0.0210 -2.23 0.0268
Drug manufacturing employm. - 0 . 0 9 7 7 0 . 1 2 5 8 - 0  . 78 0 . 4 3 8 3
Percentage chain pharmacists - 0 . 0 2 0 5 0 . 0 2 2 8 - 0 . 9 0 . 3 6 9 2
Per capita income -0.0005 0.0001 -4.1 0.0001
Estimates significant at the five percent leve are in boldfaced print.
Table 2.7c: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Total 
profit (1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 ).______________ _______________________________
■ N I H i l l i l l i M M H hbbhhhi^ b h wmammH H O n
| Constant 46.7106 3.6414 12.83 0.000111IS
12.8366 4.9559 2.59 0.0102
Perredpientfdwi^ 0 . 0 1 7 5 0 . 0 1 1 9 1 . 4 8 0 . 1 4 1 2
3 . 8 4 3 0 1 9 . 9 5 0 7 0 . 1 9 0 . 8 4 7 4
Medicaidredpiehts/popWatiori - 0 . 0 0 6 5 0 . 0 1 5 1 1 o 4* OJ 0 . 6 6 8 5
Percentege AEhAmenibership - 0.1966 0.0324 6.07 0.0001
Percentage AMAmembersHip. - 0 . 0 2 0 4 0 . 0 2 4 4
COO1 0 . 4 0 4 1
Drug manufacturing emprbym.. 0 . 2 3 9 0 0 . 3 3 8 0 0 . 7 1 0 . 4 8 0 2
Perceritage^£a&^ ' V- -0.1888 0.0341 -5.54 0.0001
Per capita.ihcome.. -0.0007 0.0002 -3.52 0.0005
Estimates significant at the five percent leve are in boldfaced print.
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Table 2.8a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable:
Dispensing Fee (1990-1994).
4.4926 0.5675 7.92 0.0001
0 . 4 4 1 7 0 . 3 7 7 6 1 . 1 7 0 . 2 4 3 2
- 0  . 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 0 1 1 - 1  . 2 4 0 . 2 1 7 4
:i \ 8.3641 1.9044 4-39 0.0001
-0.0031 0.0012 -2.63 0.0093
IW
I
1 1 1 0.0119 0.0030 4.01 0.0001
-0.0066 0.0029 -2.27 0.0240
- 0  . 0 1 9 5 0 . 0 1 9 0 - 1 . 0 2 0 . 3 0 6 7
P C T < » Q tag & ,c fi^ p fi^ aS s t^ '| -0.0089 0.0024 -3.75 0.0002
Per capitaincome I -0.0001 0.0000 -3.4 0.0008
E stim a te s  s ig n ifican t a t th e  five  p e rc e n t lev e a re  in b o ld faced  p rin t.
Table 2.8b: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: 
Percentage markur
Constant. 10.4437 3.6124 2.89 0.0042I11
- 3  . 3 1 2 6 2 . 7 8 9 0 - 1 .  19 0 . 2 3 6 2
0 . 0 0 8 2 0 . 0 0 8 0 1 . 0 3 0 . 3 0 5 5
-57.0285 12.5459 -4.55 0.0001
MedicafddfecfpleB^^ 0.0394 0.0077 5.09 0.0001
0.0491 0.0218 2.25 0.0254
Percentage AMAfmembersftip -0.0345 0.0176 -1.96 0.0515
Drug manufacturing employm. 0.4477 0.1706 2.62 0.0093
Percentage chaiapharmacists - 0  . 0 3 1 5 0 . 0 1 6 2 - 1 .  94 0 . 0 5 3 7
Per capita income - 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 1 . 4 9 0 . 1 3 7 7
Table 2.8c: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Total 
profit (1990-1994).
.Constant. . 49.6113 4.6472 10.68 0.0001
- 0 . 4 6 5 8 3 . 4 5 6 0 - 0 . 1 3 0 . 8 9 2 9
^ e c i ^ i p i e n i a j i ^ W u ^ -0.0249 0.0097 -2.58 0.0104
iE g ^ g s ^ g c g @ ® te a i^ ^ ^ ^ 1 2 . 4 9 6 7 1 6 . 0 4 7 2 0 . 78 0 . 4 3 6 9
M edicaidreapients/population - 0 . 0 1 5 6 0 . 0 1 0 1 - 1 . 5 5 0 . 1 2 2 6
PercentageAEhAmembership 0.0656 0.0281 2.34 0.0203
^ercei^e^S^m C T Sem B ife; -0.0534 0.0230 -2.32 0.0213
;D higm ianufacti& 0 . 3 3 7 8 0 . 1 8 9 4 1 . 7 8 0 . 0 7 5 8
-0.0995 0.0204 -4.87 0.0001
•j& m m m B tg g m sB m -0.0008 0.0002 -4.12 0.0001
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The Medicaid Recipients And Prescription Drug Expenditures Equations 
Medicaid recipients
The regression results are summarized below and shown in Tables 2.9a and 2.9b.
1. The median voter variables all carry the expected signs for both time periods, and are 
mostly statistically significant. Per capita income has a positive and significant 
impact in both periods; the tax price has a negative coefficient, but is significant only 
in the second period; the welfare share of the budget, reflecting the median voter’s 
tastes for providing service to the poor is positive and significant in the first period; 
the percentage of individuals under the age of 21 has a positive influence and is 
significant in the second period; and, the percentage of African Americans has a 
negative and significant impact in the first period.
2. The demand control variables do not perform as well. The number of individuals 
under the federal poverty level has a significant and positive impact in both periods as 
expected. The unemployment rate has a negative estimated coefficient in the first 
period, but becomes positive and insignificant in the second. Relative benefits also 
do not follow the expected behavior.
3. The interest group variables also show mixed results. The per capita hospital beds 
variable, used as a proxy for the hospital industry’s influence, has a positive impact. 
The coefficient is significant in the first period. The percentage of physicians 
belonging to the AMA is significant in both periods, but changes from having a 
positive to a negative impact.
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4. The policy variables included in the model were a dummy variables representing the 
impact of OBRA 1987 for the first period, and OBRA 1990 in the second period. The 
results indicate that neither OBRA 1987 nor OBRA 1990 had a significant impact.
Prescription drug expenditures
The regression results for these equations are discussed below and are shown in
Tables 2.10a and 2.10b.
1. The first group of variables consists of the dependent variables of the preceding 
equations. In the first period the dispensing fee, percentage markup, and number of 
Medicaid recipients all have a highly significant impact. The percentage markup and 
the number of Medicaid recipients both have the expected positive impact on drug 
expenditures. However, the results indicate a negative relationship between the level 
of dispensing fees and prescription drug expenditures in period one. Diagnostic tests 
revealed that the dispensing fee exhibited little variation in this period, causing it to 
be highly collinear with the intercept term, and providing, at least in part, an 
explanation for this contradictory result. Therefore, more weight is given to the 
results of the second period, in which the problem appeared to be alleviated to some 
extent. In the second period the dispensing fee, the percentage markup, and the 
number of Medicaid recipients are all statistically significant with the expected 
positive sign.
2. The drug cost containment policy variables do not have a consistent impact. The 
presence of drug formularies and DUR programs does not have the anticipated effect 
on drug expenditures in either period. However, states with a larger co-payment 
amount do have lower drug expenditures in the first period. This variable becomes
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insignificant in the later period. The weak performance of drug containment policies 
may be due to their endogenous nature.31 Perhaps a more fully specified model, 
including equations explaining the enactment of these policies, would produce more 
agreeable results.
3. The state characteristics also have mixed influences. The percentage of the 
population over the age of 65 has a positive and significant impact in the first period, 
but is negative and significant in the second. The percentage of AFDC recipients 
under age 21 is not significant in either period. The percentage of the population 
living in metropolitan areas changes from negative and significant in the first period 
to positive and significant in the second.
4. The provider variables perform well: both the per capita pharmacists and per capita 
physicians variables have a positive impact, although the former is only significant in 
the second period.
5. The non-drug policy variables fluctuate both in significance and sign between the two 
periods.
Table 2.9a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Recipients (1985-1989).
Constant -955764.4600 275768.2000 -3.47 0.0007
Per capi&mcbhie 17.4271 3.9242 4.44 0.0001
Taxpffce ' - 3 8 3 2 . 2 7 0 0 2 2 1 7 . 6 0 0 0 - 1 . 7 3 0 . 0 8 5 7
Welfare shamofithejnidgrt . 594068.1300 132395.6000 4.49 0.0001
.P e ix ^ ta i;e ^ L p Q k ltm d ^ % ^ 2 1 '; i 7 2 9 . 4 7 2 0 6 6 2  . 09 3 7 l . l 0 . 2 7 2 1
-3302.9500 1289.6000 -2.56 0.0113
Num berof peopl&in poverty 0.1275 0.0342 3.73 0.0003
Unemployment rate -10202.9900 2719.6000 -3.75 0.0002
Real relative benefits - 8 3 7 8 4 . 6 8 0 0 2 8 9 2 0 4 . 2 0 0 0 1 O to 0 . 7 7 2 4
Per capita hospitalbeds 31936.5600 2127.1000 15.01 0.0001
Percentage. AM&inembersbip 1623.8200 650.9565 2.49 0.0135
OBRA.1987. 15671.1400 6395.8000 2.45 0.0153
Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print.
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-991052.7800 487164.9000 0.0434
43.6286 19.3437 2.26 0.0253
-8222.0700 3224.8000 -2.55 0.0116
1 8 1 4 4 6 . 8 2 0 0 2 2 7 4 5 0 . 6 0 0 0 0 . 8 0 . 4 2 6 1
7228.2300 1998.1000 3.62 0.0004
- 2 9 4 3 . 3 3 0 0 1 8 8 1 . 5 0 0 0 • 1 . 5 6 0 . 1 1 9 5
0.6376 0.0502 12.7 0.0001
5 7 2 2 . 8 3 0 0 7 0 2 4 . 1 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 0 . 4 1 6 3
-1852998.0100 606420.7000 -3.06 0.0026
6 3 4 6 . 6 8 0 0 3 7 0 9 . 3 0 0 0 1 . 7 1 0 . 0 8 8 8
-4773.1900 1797.2000 - 2.66 0.0086
OBR&'lSSOr - 1 6 4 6 . 5 0 0 0 1 8 4 9 6 . 5 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 9 2 9 2
Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print.
Table 2.10a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Log of 
Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditures (1985-1989).
constant 14.2988 0.5879 2432 0.0001
Dispensing Fee -0.1561 0.0393 -3.97 0.0001
Percentage Markup 0.3665 0.0664 5.52 0.0001
Medicaid Recipients 0.4939 0.0294 16.83 0.0001
Restricted Formulary 0.4865 0.1036 4.70 0.0001
Drug Utilization Review 0 . 1 0 7 5 0 . 0 6 4 2 1 . 6 7 0 . 0 9 5 7
Drug Co-payment -1.0541 0.1276 -8.26 0.0001
Percentage o f pop. age 65+ 0.0375 0.0113 332 0.0010
Percentage AFDC age 21- - 0 . 0 0 9 2 0 . 0 0 6 3 - 1 . 4 6 0 . 1 4 6 2
Percentage o f pop. Metropolitan -0.0126 0.0029 -4.26 0.0001
Per Capita Pharmacists 3 2 1 . 6 3 2 6 2 9 5 . 3 5 1 4 1 . 0 9 0 . 2 7 7 4
Per Capita Physicians 1169.8500 181.7862 6.44J 0.0001
Trend 0 . 0 0 2 8 0 . 0 1 7 0 0 . 1 6 0 . 8 7 0 5
Limits on coverage for HI*1 cases 0.6087 0.0839 7.25 0.0001
Medicare principles for HI cases 0 . 1 0 2 3 0 . 0 8 0 8 1 . 2 7 0 . 2 0 6 7
Limits on skilled nursing services 0 . 2 3 7 1 0 . 1 3 2 7 1 . 7 9 0 . 0 7 5 5
Prior authorization for ICFMR*2 - 0 . 1 2 7 2 0 . 0 8 4 3 - 1 . 5 1 0 . 1 3 2 9
Limits on physicians’ HI visits -0.3918 0.0779 -5.03 0.0001
Prior auth. for physicians’ services 0.1272 0.0622 2.05 0.0421
Medicare principles physician 0.3323 0.1170 2.84 0.0050
Co-payment on physician 0.4189 0.1371 3.06 0.0025
Limits on coverage for HO*3 cases 03196 0.1104 2.90 0.0042
Medicare principles for HO cases - 0 . 1 8 2 3 0 . 1 0 7 6 - 1 . 6 9 0 . 0 9 1 6
Estimates significant at the five percent level are 
"Intermediate Care Facilities Mental Retardation
in boldfaced print. "‘Inpatient Hospital. 
. "3Hospital outpatient
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Table 2.10b: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Log of
Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditures (1990-1994).
constant 11.3211 0.5387 21.02 0.0001
DispensingjTee 0.1619 0.0385 4.2 0.0001
Percentage Markup 0.1585 0.0557 2.85 0.0049
Medicaid Recipients 0.2124 0.0105 2033 0.0001
Restricted Formulary 0.3298 0.0981 3.36 0.0009
Drug Utilization Review 0.2617 0.0659 3.97 0.0001
Drug Co-payment - 0 . 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 4 5 4 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 9 7 6 3
Percentage ofpop . age 65+ -0.0301 0.0111 -2.71 0.0072
Percentage AEDC age 21- 0 . 0 0 3 7 0 . 0 0 6 2 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 5 3 3
Percentage of.pop.MetropoIitan 0.0157 0.0023 6.76 0.0001
Per Capita Pharmacists 7466.0900 920.8410 8.11 0.0001
Per Capita Physicians 657.7054 68.2239 9.64 0.0001
Trend 0.0590 0.0245 2.41 0.0167
Limits on coverage for HI cases 0.3557 0.0647 5.5 0.0001
Medicare principles for HI cases 0.1602 0.0610 2.63 0.0092
Limits on skilled nursing services - 0  . 1 0 5 9 0 . 1 3 0 4 1 O CD H 0 . 4 1 7 9
Prior authorization for ICFMR 0.1766 0.0843 2.1 0.0373
Limits on physicians’ HI visits 0 . 1 2 8 9 0 . 0 6 9 0 1 . 8 7 0 . 0 6 3 1
Prior auth. for physicians’ services 0.3447 0.0609 5.66 0.0001
Medicare principles physician 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 0 6 7 6 1 . 8 5 0 . 0 6 5 8
Co-payment on physician - 0 . 0 3 8 2 0 . 0 4 5 8 - 0 . 8 3 0 . 4 0 5 3
Limits on coverage for HO cases 0 . 0 84 1 0 . 0 8 2 9 1.01 0 . 3 1 1 5
Medicare principles for HO cases 0 . 0 44 2 0 . 0 6 9 3 0 . 64 0 . 5 2 3 9
Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print.
SECTION II.VI: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study investigated the influence of public interest factors and special interest 
groups on reimbursement levels of Medicaid covered prescription drugs. Regarding the 
former, there is little to no evidence supporting the hypothesis that relative budget 
surpluses and the share of states’ Medicaid budgets devoted to prescription drug 
expenditures have any impact on reimbursement rates. On the other hand, the results 
indicate that states with high per recipient drug expenditures generally support lower 
reimbursement rates in the second time period.
Regarding the special interest groups the results indicate that the APhA, in 
particular, and the AMA have been successful in representing their members’ interest. As
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predicted, the number of pharmacists belonging to the APhA has a consistent positive 
effect on the reimbursement of both the individual components and the total profit 
reimbursement levels. The American Medical Association generally has a negative and 
significant impact on pharmaceutical drug reimbursements rates, especially in the second 
period. Similarly, the results suggest that the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry has 
a stronger influence in the second period. In contrast the Medicaid recipient group does 
not have a consistent impact on reimbursement levels, probably due to its limited political 
and organizational power.
In summary, this study finds that relative strengths of special interest groups, to a 
large extent, explain the observed variation in reimbursement levels of prescription drugs 
covered by the Medicaid program, particularly in the second period. Pertaining to the 
dispensing fee and percentage markup, the elasticity coefficients associated with the 
percentage APhA membership variable, calculated at the average values, are (0.074) and 
(0.113) in the first period. In the second period these elasticities rise to (0.250) and 
(0.590), respectively, indicating increased influence of this interest group. With an 
average dispensing fee and percentage markup of $3.00 and 10%, respectively, the second 
period elasticities imply that a 10% increase in the strength o f the APhA would result in a 
1.13% and 5.9% increase in the dispensing fee and percentage markup, respectively.
Using an average drug price of $23.28 in 1994 and the approximate total number of drugs 
processed in that year, (385,845,921), this would increase expenditures by an estimated 
$13 million and $46 million, pertaining to dispensing fees and markup, respectively. This 
clearly demonstrates the impact that interest groups have on legislation and expenditure 
levels.
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At the creation of Medicaid the federal government established a minimum level 
of services (both mandatory and optional) which must be covered under state run 
programs.32 The argument for federal control was to ensure some equality regarding the 
medical treatment of the poor across the nation. Recent trends in the majority republican 
congress, however, indicate growing support for transforming AFDC into a block grant 
provided by the federal government to the states. The block grants would be based 
inversely on the states’ per capita income, similar to the FMAP, providing states with the 
power to operate and finance their own programs.
A great deal of the existing literature has been devoted to explaining the observed 
variation in the coverage of services and the treatment of the poor under Medicaid across 
states.33 The poor are not treated uniformly as pertaining to medical services provided by 
the Medicaid system.34 One implication of a shift in the balance of power from the 
federal government to the state level could be a rise in the influence of interest groups 
and, consequently, an increase in the existing disparities in the treatment of the poor 
between states. This argument is further supported by the median voter model applied in 
the recipients equation. The tastes and preferences of the median voter at the state level 
have significant and consistent explanatory power regarding variation in the size of 
programs across states.
Drug reimbursement policies which determine per drug expenditures have a 
significant impact on aggregate drug expenditures. With the emphasis on the second 
period of the examination, states with higher dispensing fees and percentage markups 
have, on average, higher total drug expenditure budgets. This analysis also showed that a
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strong relationship exists between the relative strengths of interest groups and the level of 
prescription drug reimbursements.
Consistent with the results obtained by others the results indicate that formularies 
do not have the intended effect on drug budgets.35 Similar results are found for Drug 
Utilization Review programs and co-payments on physician services. On the other hand, 
a co-payment on drugs appeared to have generated some savings during the first period.
In the second period, however, this variable becomes highly insignificant.
An interesting result from this analysis is the changing relationship between per 
capita income when considered at different levels of Medicaid programs. At the “ground 
level” of state decisions regarding the size of the program, concerning eligibility 
requirements, states with higher per capita incomes support larger groups of individuals. 
The states’ ability and willingness to support larger numbers of the poor is linked to their 
per capita income. However, once eligibility requirements have been established and the 
focus is directed at financing the program, the relationship changes to a negative one. At 
the financing level a state’s share of the cost varies directly with its per capita income, 
providing incentives to limit per recipient spending.
The changing structure of the equations, discussed in section HI, is highly visible 
in the regression results. On the one hand, the influence of the APhA and AMA appeared 
to be consistent, in sign and significance, and growing over time. However, on the other 
hand, the impact of a substantial number of variables fluctuates both regarding statistical 
significance and the direction of their influence, particularly in the recipient and aggregate 
drug expenditure equations, reflecting dramatically changing attitudes and politics
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surrounding the Medicaid program. Any future study, dealing with the same time period, 
should take this structural change into account, particularly regarding empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER ID
ALTERNATIVE REIMBURSEMENT METHODS AND MEDICAID HOSPITAL 
EXPENDITURES
SECTION DI.I: INTRODUCTION
Hospital inpatient services have historically claimed a relatively large percentage 
of the nation’s medical outlays. Nationally, 35.4 percent of all health care expenditures 
were devoted to hospital inpatient services in 1995. For the Medicare and Medicaid 
public health programs the percentages of outlays devoted to hospital services were 48.2 
and 24.0, respectively1. Regarding Medicaid, inpatient hospital expenditures have 
claimed a relatively large proportion of total outlays since the inception of the program 
(Table 3.1). The data in Table 3.1 also shows the growth rates in inpatient hospital 
expenditures indicating large fluctuations over time. The average real growth rate during 
the latter half of the 1970s was 3.8 percent, dropping to 0.5 percent during the 1980s.
The 1990s were also marked by large fluctuations, with average growth rates of 11.6 and 
-3.4 percent, respectively, from 1990 to 1992 and 1993 to 1996.
Given the relative size of hospital inpatient budgets, control over this component 
of medical care is crucial in states’ endeavors to subdue the growth of Medicaid 
expenditures. With this goal in mind, provider reimbursement methods became an 
important issue almost immediately following the adoption of this program. This is the 
first of two papers investigating to what extent the adoption of different provider 
reimbursement methods have been responsible for the observed periodical declines in 
Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditures.
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Table 3.1: Medicaid payments in real (medical care price index) 1982-1984 millions of 
dollars for general inpatient hospital services (1975-1996).
$25,773 $7,103 27.6
27,098 7,510 27.7 5.7 (1975-1979)
r w m z  : 28,489 8,004 28.1 6.6 3.8
i 29,113 8,078 27.7 0.9
1979 30,329 8,378 27.6 3.7
1980 31,123 8,561 27.5 2.2
1981 32,815 8,678 26.4 1.4
1982 31,783 8,292 26.1 -4.4
1983 32,198 8,760 27.2 5.7
1984 31,733 8,285 26.1 -5.4 (1980s)
1985 32,920 8,230 25.0 -0.7 0.5
1985 33,375 8,392 25.1 2.0
1982 34,593 8,640 25.0 3.0
1988 35,048 8,826 25.2 2.2
1989 36,406 8,883 24.4 0.6
1990 39,748 10,201 25.7 14.8 (1990-1992)
1991 43,381 11,201 25.8 9.8 11.6
1992 48,036 12,323 25.7 10.0
1993 50,421 12,749 25.3 3.5
1994 51,067 12,367 24.2 -3.0 (1993-1996)
1995 54,370 11,899 21.9 -3.8 -3.4
1996 51,689 10,669 20.6 -10.3
Source: Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082.
Prior to 1983, hospitals which participated in public health programs were 
primarily reimbursed for the reasonable cost of services rendered to covered patients. The 
inefficiencies inherent in the fee for service (FFS) or “retrospective” provider 
reimbursement approach have been widely discussed in the literature.2 Since 
retrospective payment amounts are based on incurred costs they do not provide any 
incentives toward economizing of medical resources. This cost based approach was 
recognized as inflationary, prompting Congress to authorize broad based experiments and 
demonstration projects to determine the feasibility of alternative reimbursement methods. 
These experiments were originally directed toward the Medicare program.
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“In 1967, section 402(a) of Public Law 90-248 delegated authority to the secretary 
to experiment with alternative methods of reimbursement — specifically, incentive 
reimbursement. This authority was further broadened in 1972 under section 
222(a) o f the Social Security Amendments of 1972 (Public Law 92-603). Under 
these amendments, prospective reimbursement methods were devised and tested 
for their ability to stimulate providers through positive (or negative) incentives to 
use their facilities or personnel more efficiently and thereby to reduce the total 
costs of the health programs involved without adversely affecting the quality of 
services ...”3
The experiments were not limited to public health programs and shortly thereafter 
several states began using prospective payment methods for the reimbursement of 
hospital costs. Some states had comprehensive systems encompassing virtually all payer 
types, while others only affected reimbursement from selected sources. However, the 
common goal was to reduce the growth of hospital expenditure levels by directly 
regulating prices and costs. States which enacted hospital rate setting laws expected to 
have lower expenditure levels.4,5,6 Following more than a decade of debate, the 1983 
Amendments to the Social Security Act, provided for a prospective payment system 
(PPS) based on diagnosis related groups (DRGs) for short-term hospital inpatient services 
rendered to Medicare patients. This PPS involves all Medicare patients throughout the 
nation.
Medicaid reimbursement to providers had also traditionally been based on FFS 
methods. As was the case with Medicare, Congress demonstrated an interest in 
encouraging experimentation with alternative reimbursement methods regarding 
Medicaid. To facilitate this OBRA 1981 (Section 2173) made it easier for states to 
experiment and adopt alternative payment systems. In addition to prospective payment 
methods, states also adopted direct utilization controls in their attempt to reduce the
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growth of hospital outlays. Similar to prospective payment, the goal of these controls is 
to discourage over utilization of services and to promote efficiency and cost effectiveness.
The 1980s witnessed a steady increase in the number of states adopting 
prospective payment systems (PPS). By 1989, 43 states had adopted a form of a PPS.7 
At the same time, however, state Medicaid hospital inpatient outlays generally continued 
to rise. Growth rates in real Medicaid general hospital inpatient expenditures are shown 
in Table 3.1. Given the continued increases in both hospital inpatient and overall 
Medicaid budgets, state agencies began experimenting with managed care, hoping to 
capitalize on the associated financial incentive systems which have proven successful in 
the private sector. From 1991 to 1996 the number of states which had Medicaid 
recipients enrolled in some managed care program increased from 33 to 49. The average 
recipient participation in managed care programs, including only states with positive 
enrollment, increased from 88,961 in 1991 to 255,730 in 1996.8
Regarding Medicaid the federal government gave states considerable discretion 
over the implementation and administration of hospital cost containment policies, 
resulting in fifty four differently structured programs.9 This discretion includes the 
methods and standards utilized for reimbursing participating providers. An interesting 
question, arising from this legislative and bureaucratic diversity, concerns the decision 
making process behind the adoption of a given reimbursement method. This paper 
examines the factors which determine why some states adopted the different types of 
PPSs, direct utilization, and managed care programs concerning the reimbursement and 
delivery of hospital services by Medicaid.
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The importance of understanding this decision making process is twofold. First, 
the initial intent of the Medicaid program was to provide medical services to the nation's 
poor in an efficient and equitable fashion, and in the quantities and qualities generally 
observed in the private sector. The nature of the decision making process may shed some 
light on whether this goal has been compromised at the state level. Second, private sector 
third party payers often follow the policies of state Medicaid programs. The remainder of 
this section discusses the prospective payment, coverage limitation methods, and 
managed care programs which states have adopted in their attempt to contain Medicaid 
hospital costs. Section three explores the theoretical model and the variables employed to 
explain the adoption of those policies. Following that, section four briefly discusses the 
data, data sources, and econometric methods employed in the estimation. Section five 
presents the empirical results, followed by a summary and discussion of policy 
implications.
Prospective Payment Systems (PPS).
Under PPSs reimbursement rates are determined by the state prior to the delivery 
of services. The state generally establishes a reimbursement rate for a base year using 
data on the average cost of providing medical services. An inflation adjustment is made 
for subsequent years. Participating providers receive this pre-specified reimbursement 
rate for each unit of service regardless of the cost of actual resources used. Hospitals 
which provide services at a cost below the prospective payment realize a profit, while 
those that have costs exceeding the fixed payment suffer a loss. This creates powerful 
financial incentives for providers to minimize costs by emphasizing efficient methods of 
treatment and by reducing utilization of inputs. Indeed, the switch from a cost based to a
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prospective payment system, based on diagnostic-related groups (DRGs)10, has been 
associated with decreased use of hospital inputs in the case of Medicare.11 Within the 
Medicaid system, the goals o f a PPS are to curb the rate of increase in the unit price of 
services, reduce the rate of increase in overall expenditures for hospital services, and to 
eliminate inequities among hospitals.
Medicaid agencies are employing any combination of three different forms of 
prospective payment systems. The first is called a rate-of-increase control system, under 
which providers are paid a fixed rate, either per day or per case, generally based on the 
institutions’ average costs. States using this method typically impose a rate ceiling, and 
make adjustment based on the type or location of a particular facility. Furthermore, 
adjustments for inflation are applied periodically. Thus, the payment rate can be 
expressed in functional form as
p ,= P (c ,t , l )  (3.1)
where p, is the prospective payment rate, c is the average cost of the institution, and t and 
/ represent the type and location of the institution.
The second form is referred to as a prospective case-mix system, where payment 
rates are based on patients’ diagnoses. This PPS has received the most attention in the 
literature, perhaps because it was adopted as the method of payment regarding short-stay 
hospital care for the Medicare program in 1983.12 Each hospital inpatient is classified 
according to a particular DRG which has an associated weighing factor. The weight 
reflects the concentration of hospital resources used for providing care to the average 
patient in that DRG, calculated across all hospitals. Multiplying an associated weighting 
factor by a predetermined rate yields the reimbursement rate to the provider. The
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predetermined rate can vary according to institution or type of institution, for example 
based on size, urban versus rural location, or teaching status. The PPS payment per 
discharge may be represented as
Pi = [(w xj)+o]x(l + a) (3.2)
where p: is the PPS payment per discharge, w is the DRG weight, s is a standardized 
payment amount, o represents a potential outlier payment, and a represents a hospital 
adjustment factor.Ij
There is crucial difference between a rate-of-increase control and DRG based 
system: in the former the prospective rate is determined starting with the particular 
institution’s average cost, while, in the latter, the rate is determined starting with a 
national or state average cost. Clearly, the former provides more flexibility in rates. 
Furthermore, states implementing rate-of-increase controls may not impose limitations on 
the number of inpatient days. Thus, losses resulting from higher than average use of 
resources could be offset by increasing the number of inpatient days.
Third, states may use a negotiated PPS where institutions make competitive bids 
to obtain a “license” to participate in the program. Recipients must use “licensed” 
providers in case of non-emergencies. Negotiated PPS has not been widely embraced by 
states and will, therefore, not be considered in the empirical analysis. Indeed, in 1992 
Delaware was the only state to employ this PPS.14 
Direct utilization control
Another policy option available to states is to impose direct controls on the 
utilization of hospital services. Utilization controls may take the following forms:
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1. Limits on inpatient days per year implying a fixed maximum number of days 
which will be covered annually by Medicaid per recipient.
2. Limits on inpatient days per stay which may be fixed or varied according to 
the diagnosis.
3. Prior authorization in the case of non-emergency admissions. According to 
this policy hospitals will not be reimbursed for “discretionary” admissions for 
which no prior authorization was obtained from the Medicaid agency.
4. Prior authorization for specific services. This is similar to point three but 
applies only to certain elective procedures.









H awaii Yes Yes
Iow a Yes Yes
Idaho Yes








M ichigan * Yes Yes Yes
Source: Health Care Financing Administration spDATA System.
* States which utilize both a DRG based and a rate of increase control approach. In this 
year there were 39 PPS states, 10 of which used both approaches. (Table Con’d.)










N ewH am pshire* Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes YesmssaBsmmm-: Yes
Yes Yes Yes
OKio"' ;* Yes Yes Yes
Oklahom a Yes Yes
O regon Yes Yes
Pennsylvania Yes Yes
RHo^e-Lilahd Yes
Sou lfcdM blin a* Yes Yes
SonthrJ)akota Yes Yes.
TeM essee Yes Yes.
Texas Yes Yes
Utah * Yes Yes Yes
Virginia Yes Yes
V erm ont Yes
W ashington Yes Yes
W isconsin * Yes Yes
W ntV irein& r Yes
Utilization controls are also designed to curb per recipient spending, for example by 
limiting the number of days a patient remains in the hospital. Notice, that severe limits, 
particularly per case limits, could discourage hospitals from serving Medicaid patients 
resulting in fewer recipients as well. On the other hand, prior authorization is clearly 
directed at reducing the number of recipients. Table 3.2 indicates whether a state 
employed a PPS or direct utilization control in 1994.
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Managed care
State Medicaid agencies employ three types of managed care programs:15 (1) 
those which reimburse providers on a FFS basis, generally referred to as primary care 
case management (PCCM); (2) those which utilize networks of physicians who are paid 
on a “capitated” or “financial-risk” basis; and (3) those which enroll Medicaid enrollees 
in health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Observe that the term PCCM is 
sometimes used as encompassing all three types of programs. In this paper it will be used 
to refer to programs which reimburse participating providers on a FFS basis. Under 
PCCM participating providers act as gatekeepers to the medical care received by 
enrollees. The providers are reimbursed retrospectively for services rendered and 
ordinarily receive an additional fixed periodical payment, usually monthly, for each of 
their enrollees. This approach does not provide the financial incentives which are 
generally associated with prepaid managed care but instead relies on enhanced continuity 
of care to generate long-term savings.16, 17
Under managed care, participating providers, generally existing HMOs or other 
prepaid health plans (PHP), receive a fixed amount per patient for a given time period, 
regardless of the amount of resources actually devoted. This severing of the link between 
reimbursement amounts and incurred costs constitutes the “risk” of prepaid managed 
care. Institutions which manage to provide for their enrolled patient group at an average 
cost below this fixed payment will enjoy a profit. Conversely, those which have an 
average cost above the fixed payment suffer a loss. This generates powerful financial 
incentives for participating providers to minimize the utilization of resources.
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S E C T I O N  f f l .n :  T H E  M O D E L
Legislation regarding the Medicaid program, particularly concerning matters of 
reimbursement levels and methodologies is an important determinant of hospital inpatient 
expenditures. Previous research indicates that PHPs and utilization controls have reduced 
Medicaid and Medicare hospital spending. In a multivariate analysis, using various 
combinations of prospective reimbursement and utilization control, Zuckerman (1987) 
showed that, concerning Medicaid, these policies are indeed associated with lower per 
recipient spending, and, in case of the latter, reductions in recipients as well.18 Custer et 
al. (1990) also provides evidence that prospective reimbursement methods have been 
successful in decreasing the use of hospital inputs in the case of Medicare. The evidence 
for savings generated by managed care is also plentiful in the empirical literature.19 In 
light of this empirical evidence, combined with the overwhelming theoretical cost 
containment arguments in favor of PPSs and managed care, one may question why 
Medicaid agencies have been reluctant to adopt these policies.
Theoretical framework: special interests, public interests and the median voter
Legislative outcomes have been explained by two main theories. The economic 
theory of legislative decision making emphasizes the role of interest groups which 
demand legislation that benefits them. According to this view, groups which are, or 
potentially would be, affected by particular legislation are willing to pay a price to 
influence the outcome. The price may be expressed in terms of campaign contributions, 
volunteer time, or the promise of favorable votes during future elections.20
For example, provider groups are unlikely to be indifferent between prospective 
and retrospective cost based systems. Furthermore, this method, while not primarily
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directed at reducing the number of inpatient recipients, could also result in fewer 
Medicaid cases if rates were set prohibitively low. Medicaid recipients would become a 
liability to hospitals, which would then be reluctant to serve this group. Therefore, the 
adoption of a prospective payment system is likely to be the product of, among other 
variables, the interaction of the affected provider and recipient groups.
Alternatively, legislators may make decisions based on their perceptions of the
public interest. Accordingly, interventions in industries result largely from the public’s
demand for legislative action. Factors such as existing budget pressures may be
significant in this respect. The median voter model, which argues that legislation is based
on the preferences and tastes of the median voter, has been used to explain the provision
of public services. In the context of public health, this model describes taxpayers as utility
maximizers who derive satisfaction from the consumption of goods and services as well
as the transfer of income to welfare recipients. The quantities of consumption goods and
services and public goods are determined by maximizing the following objective function
subject to a budget constraint:
m ax U [ X , W , Z )  s .t. Y = P , X  + P„W ( 3 .3 )
{.*■.»■}
where X is the quantity of Medicaid services provided and Px is the tax price to the 
median voter of an additional unit of service provided.21 W represents a composite 
bundle of goods and services, with price Pw, consumed by the median voter, and Z is a 
set of exogenous factors which influence the median voter’s preferences for W ox X.
Model Variables
The following is a description of the special interest, public interest, and median 
voter variables employed in the model.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
62
Interest group variables
There are several interest groups which could be affected by legislation 
concerning Medicaid hospital expenditures. Groups which share common objectives will 
likely cooperate with one another, while those with opposing goals will compete against 
each other in the lobbying process. The resources that each group is willing to allocate 
toward obtaining their goals will depend, among other factors, on the potential gains or 
losses from specific legislation.22 Some of these groups, such as hospitals and physicians 
will be affected directly, while others will notice the impact indirectly. The following 
groups have been identified as having either a direct or indirect interest in Medicaid 
related hospital reimbursement policy.
• Hospitals. This group is expected to oppose any legislation directed towards limiting 
reimbursements to hospitals. Spending or hospital revenue caps, for example, would 
impair hospitals’ ability to expand and increase their services, and may even result in 
financial difficulties. The strength of hospitals is measured in terms of the size of this 
industry approximated by the per capita hospital beds.
• Physicians. Any approach which reduces or freezes physician’s charges, directly or 
indirectly, will likely result in a fall in physicians’ incomes. Furthermore, inadequate 
payments for Medicaid patients, restricting hospitals’ ability to hire additional 
personnel or implement new technologies and facilities, would also diminish 
physicians’ productivity. Physicians are, therefore, expected to favor higher 
payments for Medicaid hospital patients and oppose prospective payment approaches. 
The political influence of physician groups is represented politically by the percentage 
of physicians who are members of the American Medical Association (AMA).
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• Insurance companies. Although they did not use these groups in their empirical 
analysis, Feldstein and Melnick identified insurance companies, unions, and the aged 
as having an interest in lower hospital costs.23 Hospitals which receive inadequate 
payments for Medicaid or uninsured patients will attempt to compensate for this by 
shifting the cost to private pay patients.24 The cost of the bulk of such private pay 
patients is covered by private insurance companies. Inadequate Medicaid payment 
levels could result in increased prices charged to non-Medicaid patients and, 
consequently, force higher premiums charged by private insurance companies.
Private insurance companies are, therefore, expected to support higher Medicaid 
payments for inpatient recipients. The influence of this groups is measured in terms 
of the percentage of private citizens with private insurance.
• Labor unions. A similar argument applies to labor unions. Lower insurance 
premiums imply savings from health care benefits, which may translate into increases 
in other fringe benefits or wage rates received by union members. These groups are 
therefore also expected to favor increased Medicaid payments to hospitals. The 
percentage of the labor force which is represented by unions is used to capture the 
influence of this group.
• Recipients. The existing empirical evidence indicates that prospective payment 
methods reduce per case hospital expenditures. Lower payment levels may result in 
fewer resources, such as time and elective diagnostic testing, devoted to Medicaid 
patients. Furthermore, sufficiently low reimbursement levels will make Medicaid 
patients a liability which hospitals will attempt to avoid, resulting in fewer recipients 
served. In the case of direct utilization controls, such as a requirement of prior
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authorization, the evidence indicates a reduction in the absolute number of 
recipients.25 Recipient groups are therefore expected to oppose these alternative 
reimbursement and cost containment methods.
Medicaid recipients, however, generally belong to low income groups possessing 
neither the resources nor the disposition for political organization.26 Legislators can 
afford to ignore the interests of these groups in the decision making process. For this 
reason, this group is not expected to have a strong impact on legislative decisions 
regarding prospective payment and direct utilization control.
Another notion which may affect the influence of the recipient population variable 
is the tradeoff between quantity and quality. Medicaid agencies may decide to cover a 
large population but limit the expenditures per recipient. Alternatively, they may 
enhance the services offered to individual recipients but limit the size of the eligible 
population. Thus, states servicing a larger Medicaid population may be more inclined 
to limit per recipient expenses by adopting PPS or utilization controls. The recipient 
group is represented by the number of recipients to population ratio.
Public interest variables
The following variables are used to capture the public’s interest in Medicaid 
legislation.
I . Budget pressures. States’ decisions to enact cost containment policies may reflect 
budget pressures. States which are experiencing large relative budget deficits, for 
example, are expected to be more likely to adopt legislation aimed at reducing costs. 
The state's relative budget deficit is defined as,
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_ , . _ , _ _ . state revenues - state expenditures
Relative Budget Deficit = -----------------------------------------
state revenues
• The tax price. The price to the median voter at the state level is determined by the 
federal Medicaid assistance percentage (FMAP), calculated as
State Per Capita Personal IncomeStateShare = : 0.45 (3.4)
National Per Capita Personal Income
The higher the federal government’s share the smaller the incentive of the median voter 
will be to adopt prospective payment systems or enact coverage limits on hospital 
inpatient services. A negative relationship is expected between the FMAP and the 
probability of states adopting cost containment policies.
• The percentage of AFDC recipients under the age of 21. The median voter is 
hypothesized to have a higher preference for providing public goods to children. 
Therefore, the percentage of AFDC recipients under the age of 21 is included in the 
model.27 A negative impact on the probability of PPS or coverage limits is expected.
• The percentage of African American recipients. Conversely, the median voter is 
expected to have a lower preference for providing public goods to minorities. To test 
this hypothesis, the percentage of African American recipients is included in the 
model. In this case the probability of PPS or coverage limits is expected to rise with 
this variable.
• Welfare outlays. Current welfare outlays as a percentage of the state’s budget is 
used to measure the median voter’s overall tastes and preferences for providing public 
goods. Higher percentages are hypothesized to indicate a favorable disposition
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toward the provision of public goods. In such states a lower probability of cost 
containment and utilization control is expected.
• Political ideology. In addition to the cost of taxation and budget pressures the 
prevailing political ideology is hypothesized to play a role in the decision making
programs such as Medicaid. To capture the effect of the dominant political ideology, 
the percentage of congressional democratic representatives in the state is used. 
Democratic representatives generally have more liberal views and are assumed to 
favor higher outlays for public welfare programs. In the context of this paper, the 
probability of establishing PPSs and direct utilization controls and managed care 
enrollment would be negatively related to the percentage of representatives who are 
democrat.
• Inter party competition (IPC). A second political variable which has been
hypothesized to effect public programs is the amount o f competition among parties."9 
When a high degree of competition exists among parties, political candidates will 
reach out to the relatively uncommitted poor by promising better benefits. 
Consequently, the marginal power of the recipient group increases, which may imply 
a lower probability of cost containment measures being implemented. The EPC is 
constructed at the state level by considering the composition of the lower and upper 
houses and the gubernatorial office in each state. First, an index of democratic 
dominance is constructed as
■70
process." It is generally believed that a more liberal sentiment favors public welfare
(3.5)
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where G,D = 1 if a democratic governor is in office, or zero otherwise; i f  and I, are, 
respectively, the number o f democratic electives and the total number of seats in the 
lower house; and U° and Ul are, respectively, the number of democratic electives 
and the total number of seats in the upper house. Thus, D, ranges from zero to one.
Extreme values would indicate total dominance by one party. An index of 0.5 would
imply an evenly divided representation and, therefore, a high degree of competition. 
The IPC index is constructed as
f A  if a  £ 05 
IPC = | ( l -  A) if A > 0i (3'6)
generating a number between 0 and 0.5, where increasing values imply increasing 
competition.
SECTION ffl.ffl: DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS
The data consists of a cross section of 47 states and a time series of six years/0 
Data sources include annual publications of Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) forms 2082 (recipient) and 64 (financial), the Medicaid spData system by the 
HCFA, the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1985 -  1997), Medical, Practice Data 
by Census Division. State, and County Group by the American Medical Association, 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs by the National 
Pharmaceutical Council (1985-1997), EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits by the 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, data collected by Professor William J. Moore at 
Louisiana State University on American Medical Association membership, and data 
collected by Professor Barry Hirsch at Florida State University on the extent of state 
unionization.
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The endogenous variables are as follows:
1. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses a PPS based on DRGs.
2. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses a PPS based on rate-of-increase 
controls.
3. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses direct utilization controls.
4. the percentage o f the Medicaid population enrolled in any type of managed care.
5. the percentage o f the Medicaid population enrolled in risk-based managed care 
programs.
The first three equations are estimated using a probit procedure. The fourth and fifth 
equations are estimated using the tobit estimator/1 Particularly in the case of capitated 
managed care enrollment a large number of observations have a zero value for the 
endogenous variable, resulting in a censored sample. Ordinary least squares is, therefore, 
no longer consistent or efficient. Data on managed care enrollment was not available for 
years prior to 1991. The fourth and fifth equations can therefore be estimated for the 
1991 to 1996 period only. For ease of comparison the remaining equations are also 
estimated for the latter six years.
SECTION m.IV: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results o f the regressions are shown in Table 3.3. Each column contains the 
results of either a Probit or Tobit regression for one of the five dependent variables: the 
use of a DRG based PPS, rate-of-increase control PPS, coverage limits, the overall 
percentage of managed care enrollment, and the percentage o f capitated managed care 
enrollment.
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Table 3.3: Regression estimates
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Coefficients which are significant at either the 1 or 5 percent level are in bold: aced print.
Prospective payment systems based on Diagnosis Related Groups
The adoption of a DRG based PPS is mainly determined by the median voter 
variables. All special interest variables have the predicted influence but are generally not 
significant. The estimates imply that labor unions, in particular, were successful in 
protecting their members’ interests. Better funded public health inpatient programs 
reduce hospitals’ need to shift costs to the privately insured. The estimated positive
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coefficient associated with the recipient to population ratio variable indicates that states 
with large programs are more likely to adopt this cost containment measure.
Regarding the median voter variables, the larger the share of expenditures funded 
by the federal government, implying a lower tax price, the less likely the adoption of this 
cost containment policy. Furthermore, the median voter was hypothesized to have a 
higher preference for providing public health care to children and a lower preference to 
support minorities. Accordingly, higher percentages of AFDC recipients under the age of 
21 and higher percentages of African Americans are, respectively, associated with lower 
and higher probabilities o f  states using a DRG based PPS to contain costs. The welfare 
share of the state budget was used to measure the median voter’s disposition toward 
supporting public health programs. Supporting this hypothesis, the estimated 
coefficients indicate a lower probability of a DRG based PPS when the welfare share of 
the states’ budget is relatively high. The inter-party competition index and the political 
ideology of the state, measured in terms of the percentage of democratic representatives, 
do not have a statistically significant impact on the probability of a DRG based PPS.
Rate of increase controls
In comparison to the first equation, the special interest variables perform 
differently. The percentage of AMA membership and the percentage of the population 
covered by private insurance variables remain insignificant. The hospital and union 
variables, however, are statistically significant with a positive influence.
An explanation o f this seemingly contradictory result may lie in the differences 
between these two types o f  prospective payment systems. Rate-of-increase control 
systems allow for more flexibility in reimbursement rates (see Section I)- Regarding the
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adoption of a PPS, interest groups face choices at different stages. At the first stage a 
choice must be made whether to support or oppose the alternative reimbursement system. 
If a group opposed to prospective payment is successful in blocking its enactment the 
process stops after this stage. The second stage represents a situation where the adoption 
of a PPS is imminent and a choice must be made regarding the type of system. At this 
stage, groups which are opposed to PPS are hypothesized to continue to lobby against the 
system which represents the most harm to their interests. To test this hypothesis an 
auxiliary Probit regression was executed including only states using a PPS, to examine 
the choice of system providing that a switch was made to prospective payment. The 
results, shown in the appendix to this paper, indicate that hospitals, private insurance 
groups, and unions favor rate-of-increase control over DRG based systems in this choice.
In contrast with the first regression, states with high recipient to population ratios 
tend to have a lower incidence of this type of PPS. Also contrary to the predictions made 
in Section II states with a larger percentage of African American recipients have a lower 
probability of adopting this PPS.
The public interest variables appear to have little impact on the adoption of rate of 
increase policies. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient associated with the welfare 
share of the budget, measuring the median voter’s disposition toward public programs, is 
negative (although significant only at the 10 percent level) as expected.
Coverage limitations
The model does not explain the use of coverage limits well. With the exception 
of the percentage o f AFDC children under 21 years of age, the estimated coefficients are 
generally either insignificant or contrary to expectations. This is likely the result of
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limited variation in the dependent variable. As shown in Table 3.2 an overwhelming 
majority of states employ coverage limits.
Managed care
Regarding managed care, existing budget pressures, measured by the states’ 
relative budget deficits, are highly significant and carry the predicted sign. The results 
also indicate that the hospital interest group has been successful in protecting its 
members’ interests in the case o f capitated managed care. Contrary to expectations, 
however, the estimated coefficient associated with AMA membership is positive. 
Regarding the median voter variables, states with a lower tax-price, indicated by a higher 
FMAP, tend to have lower percentages of recipients enrolled in managed care. 
Furthermore, states with higher percentages of AFDC children have statistically 
significant lower enrollment. Finally, the welfare share of the state budget, measuring the 
median voter’s disposition toward public programs, exhibits the predicted effect in the 
overall managed care enrollment equation.
SECTION HI.V: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis has shown that Medicaid state hospital cost-containment policies are 
influenced by both interest group and median voter variables. To the extent that these 
policies differentially impact Medicaid hospital services and expenditures, we can expect 
discrepancies in the treatment of Medicaid recipients across state borders. If public 
interests were driving these policy changes, one could at least argue that the public 
interest is being served. In many cases, however, policies are influenced by provider 
group interests. The quality and cost of Medicaid hospital care across the states will vary 
depending on the relative strength of interest groups as well as taxpayers’ generosity.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTROLLING MEDICAID INPATIENT HOSPITAL EXPENDITURES
SECTION IV.I: INTRODUCTION
Modem medicine and hospitals, along with physicians, are nearly synonymous in 
the minds of most Americans. Indeed, it is often difficult to imagine one without the 
other. Modem hospitals represent large concentrations of sophisticated medical 
technologies, highly specialized physicians, ancillary services, support personnel, and 
recovery rooms. Given this concentration, and the potentially lifesaving nature of the 
“goods” and “services” which are inherent to the health care industry, it is perhaps not 
surprising that hospital services claim a disproportionately large share of the nation’s 
medical expenditures. Pertaining to the Medicaid program the inpatient hospital share of 
expenditures has traditionally been one of the largest, claiming approximately 25 to 30 
percent of all outlays (see Figure 4.1).
Clearly, controlling hospital costs is crucial in the struggle to reduce the growth in 
the nation’s health care budget. Regarding the Medicaid program, efforts to control costs 
have been shaped by the structure of the program. The Medicaid program is part of Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965. It is a joint Federal/state funded program which 
provides health care related services to the poor. To maintain a degree of equity, 
regarding the services provided, the Federal government provides some fundamental 
guidelines for state Medicaid agencies to follow. Within these guidelines, however, 
states have substantial flexibility. In particular, “each of the states:
1. establishes its own eligibility standards;
2. determines the type, amount, duration, and scope of services;
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3. sets the rate of payment for services; and






Home Health Care (7%)
Other Care (6%) Hospital Inpatient (26%)
ICF - Mentally Reta
Physicians (7%)
Pharmaceuticals (8%) Nursing Facility/Services (25%)
Figure 4.1: Makeup of the national Medicaid program, 1994. Source : Health Care 
Financing Administration, Form 2082.
This flexibility causes considerable variation among state Medicaid programs. Pertaining 
to services which are offered (point two), the state may influence expenditure levels by
The provision of inpatient hospital services is determined by numerous factors 
interacting in a complicated system of cause and effect. In compact notation
where Ht is the level of Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditures in state “f  \  G, 
represents a vector of government policy variables which are endogenously determined, 
and X, is a vector of exogenously determined control factors. Within the context of 
inpatient hospital expenditures the policies which G, is comprised of are:
a) Direct control over prices and utilization and, as a policy goal, costs. This type of 
policy became popular during the late 1970s and remains an essential tool today. In
manipulating eligibility standards and payment rates (points one and three).2
(4.1)
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particular, direct control can be exercised by the adoption of either prospective 
payment systems (PPS) or coverage limitations.
b) Market driven managed care. Although the notion of managed care existed since the 
beginning of the twentieth century it was not widely used by Medicaid agencies until 
the 1990s.3 One important distinction between this approach and direct control is that 
States are attempting to capitalize on the financial incentive structures associated with 
prepaid health plans already developed in the private sector.
c) Indirect control through the manipulation of eligibility standards. This variable 
controls the size of the demand population and, consequently, expenditure levels.
In addition to G„ equation (1) includes a vector, X„ of exogenously determined 
factors. The variables in this vector may be grouped into the following categories: (1) 
supply side, (2) substitute and complementary services, (3) non-hospital cost control 
strategies, (4) demand and socioeconomic factors, (5) special interests, (6) federal 
policies.
Using a simultaneous equations approach, this paper examines the relative roles 
played by the policy choices. In particular, this paper compares the relative successes of 
the direct and the more market oriented cost control approaches. Figures two and three 
show the percentages of state Medicaid budgets devoted to inpatient hospital 
expenditures, indicating substantial variation both across states and over time. In 1986, 
for example, nine states had inpatient hospital expenditures claiming over 30 percent of 
their overall Medicaid budget. The number of states in this category declined to three in
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of the Medicaid budget devoted to general inpatient hospital 
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of the Medicaid budget devoted to general inpatient hospital 
expenditures, 1995. Source : Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082.
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1995, while the number of states with inpatient hospital expenditures in the 10 to 20 
percent range almost doubled from 12 to 23 in that same time period. Section II discusses 
the theoretical framework of the model, followed by a description of the variables used in 
the empirical analysis in section IE. Section IV describes the data, data sources, and 
empirical methods used, and sections V and VI provide the empirical results and a 
general discussion.
SECTION rV.II: THEORY
Direct Government And Market Driven Cost Containment Policies 
Direct hospital cost controls
The inefficiencies inherent in the traditional FFS or “retrospective” provider 
reimbursement approach have been widely discussed in the literature.4 Opponents of 
retrospective payment systems argue that it encourages, or, at least does not discourage, 
over utilization of services, since payment amounts are based on the incurred costs of the 
care provided. In addition to encouraging managed care principles, the passage of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981 (Section 2173) has also led to a 
steady increase in the number o f states adopting “prospective” payment systems (PPS).3
With prospective payment, reimbursement rates are determined prior to the 
delivery of services and are independent of the actual quantities of resources used. 
Hospitals delivering care at a cost below the predetermined payment level enjoy a profit. 
On the other hand, hospitals with costs exceeding the prospective payment level suffer a 
loss. PPS provides a powerful incentives for provider institutions to reduce the utilization 
of resources. Medicaid agencies introduced PPS to control costs by directly controlling 
prices.
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There are three types o f Medicaid PPSs: diagnosis related group (DRG) systems, 
rate-of-increase control systems, and negotiated systems. Use o f a negotiated PPS is rare 
and will not be considered in this research; only the state of Delaware employed this 
method in 1992.6 Under a rate-of-increase control system providers are paid a fixed rate, 
either per day or per case, generally based on the institutions’ average costs, typically 
subject to a ceiling. Furthermore, adjustments for inflation are applied periodically. The 
third PPS has received the most attention in the literature, perhaps because it has been the 
method of reimbursement for Medicare short-stay hospital services since 1983.7 This 
PPS is commonly known as a prospective case-mix system, according to which payment 
rates are based on patients’ diagnoses. Each hospital inpatient is “grouped” according to 
a particular DRG which has an attached weighing factor determining the typical amounts 
of resources required for treatment. Multiplying an associated weighing factor by a 
predetermined rate yields the reimbursement rate to the provider.
In addition to PPSs designed to regulate prices and costs, some states impose 
direct controls on the utilization of hospital services. These direct utilization controls 
may take the form of
1. Limits on inpatient days per year implying a fixed maximum number of days 
which will be covered annually by Medicaid per recipient.
2. Limits on inpatient days per stay which may be fixed or varied according to 
the diagnosis.
3. Prior authorization in the case of non-emergency admissions. According to 
this policy hospitals will not be reimbursed for “discretionary” admissions for 
which no prior authorization was obtained from the Medicaid agency.
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4. Prior authorization for specific services. This is similar to point three but 
applies only to certain elective procedures.
Medical care delivery strategies
Partly in response to steady post World War II increases in the share of the 
nation's wealth devoted to health care, prepaid health plans (PHP) have become 
increasingly popular. This approach’s ability to generate savings over the FFS system in 
the private sector has been widely analyzed8, and its use in Medicaid has recently gained 
momentum. Through the application of waivers OBRA 1981 encouraged states to adopt, 
among other cost-saving measures, PHPs with wide discretionary authority regarding 
their implementation.
A closely related concept, which encompasses PHPs, is Medicaid Primary Care 
Case Management (PCCM). Under this approach to managed care, a primary care 
provider is the patient’s first point of contact into the system. This characteristic, by 
itself, is expected to generate savings.9 Managed care is generally associated with more 
continuity in the delivery of care for individual patients, resulting in several desirable side 
effects, such as increased patient and provider satisfaction, improvements in patient 
attitudes, more expeditious and proficient recognition of medical problems, fewer 
laboratory tests and procedures, fewer illness visits, fewer emergency room visits, and 
potentially reduced inpatient use.10
Hurley, et al. (1993) distinguish between three types of Medicaid PCCM 
programs: (1) those which reimburse providers on a FFS basis; (2) those which utilize 
networks of physicians who are paid on a “capitated” or “financial-risk” basis; and (3)
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those which enroll Medicaid enrollees in health maintenance organizations (HMOs). 
Intuitively, the second and third types have a greater ability to generate savings.
Control Variables
The supply of hospital services, substitutes and complements
Several theoretical models have been developed to explain the dynamics of 
hospital costs, generally focusing on not-for-profit institutions because of their 
prominence in the industry. Although they do not concentrate on the delivery of 
Medicaid hospital services, in particular, they do, to a large extent, provide insight into 
that segment of the industry as well. These models focus on the supply side of hospital 
services, the logistics of which are assumed to be identical whether the demand originates 
from a Medicaid or a non-Medicaid patient. When applied to Medicaid, however, the 
outcomes predicted by these models may be skewed to the extend that they assume out- 
of-pocket payments by patients. Medicaid recipients are generally fully covered by the 
program. Concerning the decision making process, particularly regarding the quantity 
and quality of services rendered, these models may be roughly divided into those which 
assume a larger degree of control either in the hands of an administrative body or the 
medical staff.
Millard Long (1964), Melvin W. Reder (1965), Joseph Newhouse (1970), Martin 
Feldstein (1971), and Maw Lin Lee (1971) are examples of the former, assuming 
somewhat similar objective functions and constraints for hospitals. Long, for example, 
discusses a model in which hospitals attempt to maximize quantity, referred to as the 
guiding principle of their behavior, subject to a budget and quality constraint. Reder 
describes the hospitals’ goal as achieving a careful balance between the availability of
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resources, such as beds, and the number of patients admitted. Newhouse and Feldstein 
explore a model in which the objective function contains both the quality and quantity of 
care, which are maximized subject to a budget constraint. In Lee’s approach the hospital 
administration attempts to maximize a general utility function, containing such variables 
as salary, prestige, security, power, and professional satisfaction. In addition he also 
considers types of physical capital in the objective function.
On the other hand, Reder (1965) also points out that physicians, as managers of 
the production of health care services, have substantial influence regarding the demand 
for, and the supply of, hospital services. Using this notion as a starting point, Mark 
Pauly and Michael Redisch (1973), and Jeffrey Harris (1974) emphasize the decision 
making role which physicians fulfill concerning the day to day operations of a hospital. 
Pauly and Redish assume that hospital affiliated physicians enjoy control over hospital 
facilities at any point in time. In this framework, physicians can enhance the quality of 
their product by combining it with hospital services. In his description of the “split” 
organizational structure o f hospitals, Harris points to the necessity of “decentralized” 
decision making. The physician acts as an agent who decides which patients are 
admitted, how long they will stay, and what inputs they will receive.
Supply side factors, therefore, are essential in determining the level of inpatient 
hospital expenditures under Medicaid, or any other payment program. As numerous 
authors have pointed out, one of a hospital’s goals is to minimize the number of empty 
beds. Furthermore, the role of physicians, particularly hospital affiliated, is to 
complement their services with those encountered in a hospital. On the other hand, as 
was empirically investigated by Miller (1988), office based physicians’ services and
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outpatient hospital services, for example, may act as substitutes for inpatient hospital 
services.
Demand and socioeconomic factors
Health is perceived of as a durable good, or a type of capital, from which 
individuals enjoy a flow of services. According to this notion, developed by Michael 
Grossman (1972), this flow of services is consumed by individuals during their 
lifetimes.11 Each individual is bom with an initial endowment of a stock o f health, which 
is subject to depreciation and augmentation. Depreciation may stem from such factors as 
aging or incidences of illness. Augmentation may originate from a healthy lifestyle or an 
investment in medical services. Thus, starting with an endowment at the beginning of a 
given period, say a year, people can augment their stock of health. The demand for 
medical services is, therefore, interpreted as derived from the demand for health. The 
second set of variables that effect expenditure levels are related to the demand side of the 
industry. Aside from the size of the population the demand for health, and therefore the 
demand for medical services, varies with specific socioeconomic factors, such as sex and 
age.
Interest groups
Legislation regarding the Medicaid program, particularly concerning matters of 
reimbursement levels and methodologies, are important determinants of inpatient hospital 
expenditures. Legislative outcomes have been explained as outcomes of a function 
containing public interest and special interest factors. The former claims that 
interventions in industries result largely from the public’s demand for legislative action. 
Alternatively, the economic theory of special interests argues that legislation is demanded
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by groups with related interests.12, u  14,15 Groups which would benefit, or lose, from 
particular legislation have an incentive to exercise their influence in the decision making 
process. Hospitals and physician interests, for example, will be affected directly by 
legislation regarding reimbursement methods or the freedom to recommend and provide 
the treatment deemed most appropriate for an individual patient. Clearly, any analysis of 
Medicaid hospital expenditures must account for the impact of the interaction between 
these groups and the legislative process.
Federal policy
The Medicaid program is a joint federal/state program which provides medical 
care to the nation’s poor. At its creation the federal government established a minimum 
level of services, both mandatory and optional, which must be covered under state run 
programs.16 The argument for federal control was to ensure some equality regarding the 
medical treatment o f the poor. Within this framework the federal government has 
continued to affect the scope of the program, for example through changes in eligibility 
requirements which are passed down to the states.
SECTION IV.HI: MODEL VARIABLES
Hospital cost containment policies consist of prospective payment methods, 
utilization controls, and managed care enrollment. A detailed discussion of these 
variables is presented in the preceding essay “Alternative Reimbursement Methods And 
Medicaid Hospital Expenditures.” The decision to adopt cost containment policies is 
treated as endogenous. States which experience budget pressures, perhaps due to high 
Medicaid expenditures may be more likely to adopt cost containment measures. If this is 
the case, the results may incorrectly indicate a positive relationship, for example,
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between the use of PPS and inpatient hospital expenditure levels. Furthermore, the 
presence of special interests and the preferences of the median voter are likely to affect 
the support for such alternative systems. It is, therefore, clear that the enactment of a PPS 
should be treated as endogenous.17 By treating the decision as endogenous the effects of 
the latent factors which determine whether a state adopts a PPS are entered into the 
model.
Industry supply, substitute, and complementary characteristics
• Per capita hospital beds. This variable provides a measure of hospitals’ capacity 
and, albeit crudely, the probable availability of facilities. States with high beds to 
population ratios are more likely to have excess capacity. Affected hospitals would, 
presumably, have more relaxed policies regarding the admittance of Medicaid 
patients. A significant positive relationship between available hospital beds and 
expenditure levels may indicate evidence for the induced demand hypothesis, 
according to which providers can stimulate demand to minimize excess capacity or to
1 ftmcrease mcome. Per capita beds, as opposed to the total number of beds, is used 
because of severe multicollinearity between the latter and the number of Medicaid 
recipients in the state. The per capita beds variable is defined as
, , hospital beds (x 1000)per capita beds = ----   .
state population
• Hospital based physicians in patient care. This sub-set of physicians has easy 
access to hospital services at any point in time to complement and enhance the quality 
of their own product. Thus, the larger the percentage of hospital based physicians, the 
more hospital services will be used and the higher expenditure levels will be.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
91
• Office based primary care physicians in patient care. A separate measure for 
private (non hospital based) physicians, particularly the percentage of physicians who 
are general practitioners, is included to account for the differences regarding their 
interaction with hospital facilities. The services provided by this subset of physicians 
are hypothesized to be substitutes to inpatient hospital services. Surgeons and other 
hospital based physicians are more likely than general practitioners, who are usually 
more independent and versatile, to induce increased inpatient hospital care.19 An 
increase in the supply of, and, consequently access to office based general 
practitioners’ services should, ceteris paribus, reduce utilization of inpatient hospital 
services.
• Medicaid physician, outpatient hospital, and other services. Different Medicaid 
services are not provided independently of one another. Since Medicaid recipients 
generally do not have any out-of-pocket expenses, they will likely seek the most 
effective and comprehensive type of care as their first choice. If the first-choice 
service becomes restricted due to federal or state policies, demand for such services 
will likely be diverted to substitute services. Regarding inpatient hospital services, 
for example, the empirical literature has demonstrated a complementary relationship 
with physician, outpatient hospital, and clinic services.20 In an analysis examining the 
interaction between physician and inpatient services in the Medicare system, Miller et 
al., 1997 find that this relationship is particularly strong from physician to hospital 
services, while a weaker relationship exists in the opposite direction.21
In addition to the general supply side substitute and complementary factors 
employed in the model, several non-hospital cost containment variables are tested as
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well. Successful policies which are designed to reduce utilization of substitute and 
complementary services should have, respectively, positive or negative impacts on 
inpatient hospital use. Observe that these policies are treated as exogenous with 
respect to inpatient hospital expenditures even though their enactment is determined 
by individual state Medicaid agencies. The following non-hospital cost containment 
control policies are included; if the state
1. has limits on the coverage of outpatient hospital services.
2. uses Medicare principles, or prospective payment, for the reimbursement of 
outpatient hospital services.
3. has limits on the coverage of skilled nursing facility services.
4. has limits on mentally retarded intermediate care facility services.
5. has limits on physicians’ inpatient hospital visits.
6. requires prior authorization for certain physician services.
7. uses Medicare principles to reimburse physician services.
Demand and socioeconomic variables
• Recipients. States have wide discretion regarding the eligibility requirements which 
individuals must meet to qualify for Medicaid covered benefits. As such, states may 
use this source of control to limit or expand the eligible population, and, 
consequently, the recipient population, depending on the fiscal context. The number 
of recipients in any particular year is, therefore, assumed to be endogenously 
determined.22
• Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Since it was first recognized in
1981, the number of cases of the most severe form of the Human Immunodeficiency
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Virus (HIV), AIDS, increased steadily throughout the 1980s and most of the first half 
of the 1990s. The treatment of this deadly disease is relatively expensive, with 
estimates of lifetime medical care costs ranging from a low of $38,00023' 24 to a high 
of approximately $147,000.25
The incidence of this disease has three potentially important implications 
pertaining to Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditure levels and the variations in 
those expenditures across states. First, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) estimates the proportion of AIDS patients who depend on Medicaid for their 
medical needs to be approximately 40 percent. This relatively high percentage is not 
likely to decline considering that the disease’s victims are generally poor, lack private 
insurance, and are too young to qualify for Medicare. Second, relating to variations 
between states, AIDS cases are relatively concentrated in only a few states. 
Approximately 35 percent of all reported cases in 1994 are from California and New 
York alone. This percentage rises to 60 percent when the next three states with the 
highest number of reported cases, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey are included.26 
Third, providing that an AIDS patient meets the eligibility criteria of a particular state, 
inpatient hospital services may be most accessible given that their coverage is 
mandatory under Medicaid. Other services which are important to AIDS patients, but 
are often restricted or not available, include prescription drugs, community health 
services, dental services, and personal care services.27 Such services, if available, 
could act as substitutes for inpatient hospital services. To account for the impact of 
this disease on state expenditures, a dummy variable was constructed to represent 
these five states.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
• Percentage female. A large proportion of hospitalizations under Medicaid involve 
pregnancies, especially following OBRA 1986 and 1987 (see discussion concerning 
eligibility expansions in the federal policy section below). To account for this, the 
percentage of eligibles who are female is included in the model. A positive 
relationship is expected between this variable and inpatient expenditures.
• Family size. The care of a family member may not be a perfect substitute compared 
to that received from a medical professional, but it is personal, generally punctual, 
and associated with lower time costs. Furthermore, the cost of child care during 
hospital visits increases with the number of dependent children in the family. 
Leibowitz, et al. tested this hypothesis and found that eligibles belonging to families 
of size three or larger tend to use less care.- Given the absence of this data at the 
state level, the impact of family size is approximated by the average size of 
households in the states. A negative relationship is expected.
• Percent metropolitan population. To control for any differences in demand for 
services which may exist between urban and rural areas, the percentage of the states' 
population living in metropolitan areas is included in the model. There are two 
important reasons why hospital expenditures are expected to be higher in urban versus 
rural areas. First, urban institutions generally maintain more technologically 
advanced equipment and, therefore, on average attract more medically demanding 
patients. Second, hospitals, and therefore, hospital services are generally more 
plentiful in urban areas, reducing recipients’ time costs. This will likely result in 
higher utilization rates in metropolitan areas. However, to the extend that alternative 
forms of care, particularly ambulatory care, are more accessible in metropolitan areas
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than in more sparsely populated regions, a substitution effect toward such alternatives 
may reduce inpatient hospital expenditures. The net effect of these factors is expected 
to be positive.
• Percentage o f population age 65 and over. Individuals that reach the age of 65 are
automatically covered by Medicare. To account for the effects of Medicaid recipients 
transferring between public health programs, the percentage of the population over the 
age of 65 is included in the analysis.
Interest groups
Hospitals are expected to oppose any legislation directed towards limiting 
reimbursements for inpatient services. The influence of hospitals is represented in this 
model as a supply side factor by per capita hospital beds (defined above). Spending or 
hospital revenue caps, for example, would impair hospitals’ ability to expand and 
increase their services, and may even result in financial difficulties. The special interest 
undertones of this variable reinforces the expectations of a positive correlation with 
expenditure levels.
In addition to hospitals, physicians have been identified as having a direct interest 
in matters which affect inpatient expenditure levels. Inadequate payments for Medicaid 
patients, restricting hospitals’ ability to hire additional personnel or implement new 
technologies and facilities, would also diminish physicians’ productivity. Physicians are, 
therefore, expected to favor higher payments for Medicaid hospital patients. In addition 
to the percentage of hospital based and general practice physician variables defined 
above, the percentage membership of the American Medical Association in each state is 
used to account for a more direct political influence. Because only a small percentage of
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physicians treat a large number of Medicaid patients, this variable is not expected to have
a large impact on hospital expenditures.
Federal policy variables
• Eligibility expansions. During the latter half of the 1980s state and federal 
governments made several changes in legislation, severing the traditional link 
between AFDC and Medicaid eligibility. Most notably were provisions in OBRA 
1986 and 1987 which were directed at enhancing care for pregnant women and 
infants. Realizing the long term health and financial benefits of proper, early, and 
regular prenatal care, both the individual states and the federal government initiated 
campaigns to encourage pregnant women to seek eligibility. Furthermore, efforts 
were made to recruit and retain medical providers, particularly obstetricians.29 
Starting in 1988 these policies resulted in substantially increased annual recipient 
growth rates among pregnant women and children.30 To account for these policies a 
dummy variable to indicate years starting with 1988 will be included in the model.
• The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider Specific Tax Amendments 
of 1991. Originating out of 1981 legislation, and encouraged by Congress and the 
HCFA between 1985 and 1988, Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments 
were designed to help public and non-profit hospitals which serve a proportionately 
high number of Medicaid and uncompensated care patients. The high proportion of 
such patients prevents these hospitals from shifting costs to private pay patients as 
their counterparts are capable of doing.31,32 However, DSH payments quickly became 
entangled in special revenue enhancing schemes which were designed to raise federal
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funds for state Medicaid programs without appreciable increases in “real” state 
contributions.
For example, West Virginia and Florida were among the first states to establish 
provider specific tax and voluntary donation programs (T&D). Under these programs 
the state taxes providers or receives voluntary donations from providers, which are 
typically returned as increased reimbursement Medicaid payments. These payments 
are, subsequently, matched by the federal government based on the Federal Medicaid 
Assistance Percentage (FMAP).j3
An alternative method used to increase revenues from the federal government 
involves Inter-Governmental Transfers (IGT). Similar to T&Ds, IGTs are taxes from 
local governments or hospitals which are transferred to the Medicaid agency. These 
taxes are then used as payments to contributing institutions, for example as a DSH 
payment. Again, these payments must then be matched by the federal government 
based on the FMAP/4 effectively shifting the financial burden to other states.
Consider a state whose share of Medicaid expenses is 50 percent'35. Suppose the state 
collects $50 million from an imaginary medical institution and returns a Medicaid 
reimbursement payment of $60 million. The state, consequently, receives $30 million 
in FMAP payments, which translates into a $20 million net gain, while the institution 
enjoys an increase in funds of $10 million. The federal government suffers a $30 
million cost, which is, consequently, dispersed among all 50 states. This net gain can 
be used to maintain or enhance current programs in the state. It must be noted that 
these special financing practices result in an unfortunate side effect of artificially 
inflating inpatient hospital expenditure measures. In the example above, the state
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would report an increase in hospital expenditures of $60 million, whereas the true 
increase is only $10 million.
The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider Specific Tax Amendments, 
which are aimed at reducing states’ ability to acquire federal funds, are represented by 
a dummy variable with a value of one starting with 1992. The amendments limit the 
federal matching payments on funds acquired from T&Ds by
1. “essentially banning provider donations.
2. Capping provider taxes so that provider tax revenues could not exceed 
25 percent of the state’s share of Medicaid expenditures.
3. Imposing provider tax criteria so that taxes were ‘broad-based’ and 
providers were not ‘held harmless.’
4. Capping State DSH payments at roughly their 1992 levels.’06
A weakness of the amendment is that it concentrates on T&Ds but largely ignored 
IGTs. Nonetheless, it is expected to reduce hospital expenditures.
SECTION IV.IV: DATA AND ESTIMATION
The data consists of a cross section of 47 states and a time series of 12 years (1985 
to 1996).37 A large part of the data was obtained from annual publications of HCFA 
forms 2082 (recipient) and 64 (financial), and from the agency’s Internet site. 
Socioeconomic data was acquired from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Other significant sources include Medical, Practice Data bv Census Division, State, and 
County Group by the American Medical Association, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under 
State Medical Assistance Programs by the National Pharmaceutical Council, EBRI
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Databook on Employee Benefits by the Employee Benefit Research Institute, and data on 
unions collected by Professor Barry Hirsch at Florida State University.
To maintain adequate degrees of freedom, missing observations for the number of 
physicians for three years (1988, 1991, and 1995) were extrapolated by using the averages 
of adjacent years. A similar procedure was used to extrapolate data regarding the 
percentage of individuals in poverty, the percentage of the population which lives in 
metropolitan areas, and the average payments made to AFDC families for 1996. Given 
that the distributions of these variables across states do not exhibit significant variation 
from year to year, extrapolation should not affect the results.
Also, the data for the rate-of-increase control dummy endogenous variable was 
not completely acquired. Values prior to 1988 and after 1994 were extrapolated under the 
assumption that 1988 and 1994 values were representative of previous and following 
years. Furthermore, the results concern the latent factors which lead to the adoption of 
this policy. These factors were likely to be present some years before and after the 
implementation o f a related policy.
Equation (1) presented a general equation of inpatient hospital expenditures as:
where G\ and X, represent vectors of endogenously and exogenously determined 
variables, respectively. The vector G\ includes five latent endogenous variables, defined 
as the cost-containment sentiment in the state. As a result of the influence of these latent 
variables one observes the following: (1) whether a state has adopted a DRG based PPS; 
(2) whether a state has adopted a rate-of-increase control based PPS; (3) whether a state 
employs inpatient hospital utilization control policies; (4) the percentage of enrollees in
(4.2)
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managed care; and (5) the number of recipients in the state. Thus, the full model consists 
of six equations:
Where, y, is inpatient hospital expenditures, >’2 indicates whether the state uses of a DRG 
based PPS,j/3 indicates whether the state uses a rate-of-increase control PPS, y4 indicates 
the use of direct cost containment policies, y 5 is the percentage of recipients enrolled in 
managed care, and ̂ represents the number of Medicaid recipients. The “starred” 
variables represent the latent factors which yield the values of their “non-starred" 
counterparts. The Xx represent (N  x Kt ) matrices of the exogenous variables of each
equation, the (3, are (K , x l) vectors of unknown parameters associated with the
exogenous variables, the y, are scalar unknown parameters associated with the
endogenous variables, and the s, are the error terms.
To estimate the parameters of this simultaneous equations system, which includes 
continuous, dichotomous, and censored endogenous variables, a two stage estimator is
y .  =  y 2Y 21 + ^ > 4 . + ^ 5 * 7 5 .  + t 6Y6i + + e . (4.3a)
1 if y , > 0 
0 otherwise
(4.3b)
1 if y 3 > 0 
0 otherwise
(4.3c)




y 6 ~  X 6$ 6 + e 6 (4.3f)
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employed. Using the Probit estimator for equations (3b), (3c), and (3d), the probabilities 
that y: = /, y3 = I, andy4 = 1 are estimated to generate instruments to be used in equation 
(3a). Similarly, the predicted number of recipients (equation 3f) is used as an instrument 
for y 6. The predicted values of the percentages o f enrollees in overall and capitated 
managed care was obtained through a Tobit estimator/ Since a state will have managed 
care enrollees only if it has a Medicaid managed care program, the distribution of this 
variable is necessarily censored, implying that OLS estimates would neither be consistent 
nor efficient.
Considering the combination of continuous, dichotomous, and censored 
dependent variables in the model, the distribution of the estimator is unknown. The 
conventional standard errors could therefore not be used to make inferences. The 
bootstrap method described in Appendix B was used to reduce the bias and provide more 
reliable standard errors.39
Unfortunately, the study period had to be divided into two parts since data on two 
important variables, particularly managed care enrollment and the sex of Medicaid 
recipients, is not available for years prior to 1991. Furthermore, F-tests for structural 
breaks, using the remaining variables, indicate a changing parameter vector around that 
time period. A dummy variable model indicated that the structural break is not system 
wide, but is, in fact, limited to only a few variables. The sensitivity of the coefficients is 
tested by estimating the model for several time periods, 1985 to 1996, 1985 to 1990, and 
1991 to 1996. The 1991 to 1996 model was estimated separately with two different 
specifications of the managed care variable: overall enrollment and enrollment in 
capitated plans.
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SECTION IV.V: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 4.1 contains the results of the regressions. Each column corresponds to a 
different regression, either based on the time period or included variables:
A. Time period 1991 to 1996, executed with managed care variable “overall managed 
care enrollment.”
B. Same time period as regression A, but, using managed care variable “enrollment in 
capitated managed care,” to test the hypothesis that risk based plans produce larger 
savings.
C. Time period 1985 to 1996. This regression, using the full period, was executed to 
examine the long term effects of the variables. Most variables are not affected by the 
structural break; therefore associated coefficients keep their traditional interpretation.
D. Time period 1985 to 1991. This regression was executed to examine the sensitivity of 
the coefficients over time.
The Impact Of Endogenous Policy Variables 
Managed care
States with higher percentages of their Medicaid population enrolled in managed 
care programs have significantly lower inpatient hospital expenditures. Both managed 
care variables are significant. Surprisingly, the coefficient on capitated enrollment is only 
slightly higher, although much more significant as indicated by the associated t-statistic. 
The first specification included FFS-based managed care which relies on enhanced 
continuity of care to generate long-term savings. Note, however, that Medicaid recipients 
generally remain eligible to receive care covered by the program for an average of only a
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few months to a year. Eligibility for Medicaid tends to be transitory, a characteristic 
which does not complement the objective of enhanced continuity of care.40 
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t-values are in parentheses. Estimates which are significant at the five percent level are in 
boldfaced print. (Table Con’d.)
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DRG based PPS
States which have implemented a DRG based PPS generally also have 
significantly lower inpatient hospital expenditures. In equation A, which employs the 
overall specification of managed care enrollment, the estimated coefficient remains 
negative but is statistically insignificant. The decrease in significance is likely the result 
of the collinearity between overall managed care enrollment and the use of DRG and rate- 
of-increase control PPSs, making it statistically difficult to separate the individual 
impacts of these variables. Because o f this more weight is given to the estimates from the 
second equation.
Rate-of-increase control based PPS
A similar pattern in the significance of the estimated coefficients is found between 
the DRG and rate-of-increase control based PPS variables. Again, the collinearity 
between these variables and overall managed care enrollment is suspected to be the cause. 
There is also an interesting pattern in the absolute sizes of the coefficients of the PPS 
variables over time. Comparing the coefficients associated with DRG and rate-of- 
increase control variables between equations D, C, and B, a clear upward trend is
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apparent. This provides evidence that larger savings are achieved as alternative 
reimbursement programs mature.
Coverage limitations
The estimated coefficients associated this variable indicate that states which 
imposed coverage limitations enjoyed significantly lower expenditures only before 1991 
(equations C and D). The lack of significance in the 1991-1996 equations is due to the 
limited variation in this variable across states during this period. As indicated in Table 
4.2, most states have employed coverage limitations in the 1990s, causing this variable to 
be highly correlated with the constant term. Based on the 1985-1990 equation we 
conclude that coverage limitations do significantly lower inpatient hospital expenditures. 
The Impact O f The Control Variables
The supply of hospital services, substitutes, and complements
The predicted effect of the per capita hospital beds, measuring availability, is 
significant only in regressions C and D. This provides limited evidence for the supplier 
induced demand hypothesis. The estimated coefficients for the percentage of office based 
general practitioners and the percentage of hospital based physicians indicate, 
respectively, substitute and a complementary relationships with hospital services. States 
which have a higher percentage of general practitioners enjoy lower hospital 
expenditures, and, most likely lower overall medical outlays considering the lower cost 
associated with office based care.
Besides office based physician services, the estimates also indicate a substitute 
relationship between inpatient hospital services and skilled nursing facility services, 
intermediate care services, certain physician services, and hospital outpatient services.
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States which limit the coverage of these services have higher inpatient hospital 
expenditures, indicating that the excess demand created by these policies is diverted to 
the hospital component. On the other hand, as expected, a complementary relationship 
exists between inpatient hospital services and physician inpatient hospital services. 
Table 4.2: States which utilized a prospective payment system in 1994.
. ATaKaniar "r . . Yes
. Yes Yes
California . Yes Yes





H aw aii Yes Yes
Iowa Yes Yes
Idaho . Yes
.Illinois * Yes Yes Yes
S n M n a ^ Yes
G u n s Yes Yes
Kentucky Yes Yes
Louisiana Yes Yes
M assachusetts Yes Yes
Maryland Yes
M aine Yes
?Michigan. * Yes Yes Yes
M innesota Yes
M issouri . Yes Yes









N ew Y ork * Yes Yes Yes
Source: Health Care Financing Administration spDATA System.
* States which utilize both a DRG based and a rate of increase control approach. In this 
year there were 39 PPS states, 10 of which used both approaches. (Table Con’d.)
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Table 4.2: Continued
O hio. * Yes Yes Yes
Oklalioiina •„ Yes Yes
Yes . Yes
•TeriiMylvaiua. Yes . Yes
iS f io S e lli iS v Yes




Utah. * Yes Yes Yes
Virginia Yes Yes
Verm ont ...... . Yes
W ashington Yes Yes
W isconsin * Yes Yes
W est Virginia • Yes
Demand and socioeconomic factors
The demand and socioeconomic variables all have the predicted impacts. The 
predicted number of recipients has an expected strong positive impact on expenditure 
levels; states with a large number of reported AIDS cases have significantly higher 
inpatient hospital expenditures; the percentage of female recipients, although generally 
not significant at the 5 percent level, is associated with higher expenditures; states with 
higher average households have lower expenditures; and, larger metropolitan populations 
are associated with higher expenditures for hospital services. Also, as the percentage of 
the population over the age of 65 increases, indicating a shift from Medicaid to Medicare, 
expenditure levels under the former program fall.
Federal policies
Concerning federal policies, the Voluntary Contribution and Provider Specific 
Tax Amendments of 1991 are associated with lower inpatient hospital expenditures. 
These amendments essentially discouraged the use of special revenue enhancing
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strategies, which some states used to increase the flow of federal funds for their Medicaid 
programs. The results indicate that the amendments were successful. On the other hand, 
the OBRA 1987 dummy variable was neither significant nor did it have the expected 
positive influence on expenditure levels. This may be because of the presence o f the 
recipients variable.
SECTION IV.VI: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Regarding cost control, the results indicate that states have a variety of effective 
options in their arsenal. Capitated managed care and prospective payment systems, 
including both DRG and rate-of-increase systems, are all associated with reduced 
inpatient hospital expenditures. Using the estimated coefficients from regression B, 
approximate annual savings were calculated.41 On average, States which employ a DRG 
or rate-of-increase control PPS enjoy, respectively, $31 and $26 million lower annual 
general inpatient hospital budgets. Concerning capitated managed care, a one percentage 
increase in the number of eligibles enrolled in capitated managed care generates estimated 
savings of $564,823. The average percentage enrollment in capitated managed care for 
the 1991 to 1996 period was 25 percent, indicating approximate savings of $14 million 
annually. Note that managed care in Medicaid is relatively new and that related savings 
may increase as programs mature.
The model further demonstrates important substitute and complementary 
relationships in general and between service components of Medicaid programs. In 
accordance with the findings by Miller, et al. (1997), a strong relationship exists between 
inpatient hospital and physician services. This relationship, however, is twofold; dividing 
physician services into those offered by (a) office based general practitioners and (b)
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hospital based physicians in general, the results indicate, respectively, a substitute or 
complementary relationship with inpatient hospital services. Significant substitute 
relationships also exist between inpatient hospital services and nursing facility services 
and hospital outpatient services. The relationship between inpatient hospital services and 
intermediate care facility services is significant only after 1991.42
The interrelated nature of the various components o f Medicaid emphasizes the 
importance of comprehensive analysis before cost containment measures pertaining to a 
single component are initiated. Cost containment policies relating to inpatient hospital 
expenditures, for example, will likely generate a redirection of demand toward substitute 
services. This migration of demand will, at least partly, offset any reductions in inpatient 
budgets. Furthermore, if demand is redirected to a less effective mode of care, long term 
costs may actually increase. Any public policy regarding these services must consider 
these relationships to be effective.
The results also imply a strong influence by socioeconomic variables. Acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome has resulted in significantly higher inpatient hospital 
expenditures in states with relatively high numbers of reported cases. The slowly but 
steadily falling number of reported AIDS cases over the past few years may provide a 
source of relief for these states.
A socioeconomic variable which performed remarkably well is the average 
household size in the state. A consistent and strong negative relationship is found 
between the average household size and inpatient hospital expenditures. As discussed 
earlier, this may be due to two reasons: first, larger households may mean increased time 
costs concerning hospital visits; and, second, larger households are better capable of
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producing substitute care.43 The results presented here provide support the latter 
explanation. The first would produce lower utilization only in the short-run. A condition 
that does not receive attention when necessary may worsen and require increased care at a 
later date. Since the negative relationship between household size and expenditure levels 
is stable over time (see regressions A through D), the substitute care hypothesis is favored 
over the alternative.
SECTION IV.Vn: SECONDARY EQUATIONS 
The secondary dependent variables are:
1. the number of Medicaid recipients in the state,
2. a dummy variable indicating whether a state has adopted a DRG based PPS,
3. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses a rate-of-increase PPS,
4. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses coverage limitations,
5. the percentage of managed care enrollment.
The variation in the size of Medicaid programs across states is explained using a Median
voter model. According to this model taxpayers derive utility from the consumption of
goods and services as well as from the transfer of income to welfare recipients. The
median voter determines the quantity of public goods by maximizing a utility function
subject to a budget constraint:
maxU{X,W,Z) s.t. Y=PZX+PV,W (4.A.1)(.v.in
where X is the quantity o f Medicaid services provided and Px is the tax price to the 
median voter of an additional unit of service provided. W represents a composite bundle 
of goods and services, with price Pw, consumed by the median voter, and Z  is a set of 
exogenous factors which influence the median voter’s preferences for Wor X. The
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specific model used in this case is discussed in the first essay “An Analysis Of The 
Variation In Reimbursement Rates Of Pharmaceutical Drugs Under Medicaid.”
The three direct inpatient hospital cost containment and the managed care
theory of regulation, developed by Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler. These equations 
are discussed in detail in the third essay “Prospective Payment Methods And Hospital 
Expenditures: Special Interests And The Median Voter.”
SECTION IV.VHI: BOOTSTRAPPING METHOD 
The model to be estimated consists of six equations:
Where, y x is hospital inpatient expenditures, ̂ 2,73, and ̂ represent the use of direct cost 
containment policies, y 5 is the percentage of recipients enrolled in managed care, and y6 
represents the number of Medicaid recipients. The “starred” variables represent the latent 
factors which yield the values of their “non-starred” counterparts. The X, represent
equations are estimated using a combination of the median voter model and the economic
y  i =T;Y2 +yjY3 + T4*Y4 +T 5Y5 +JV/6 + *iPi + e i (4.B.la)
1 if y\  > 0 
0 otherwise
(4.B.lb)
1 if yj > 0 
0 otherwise
(4.B.lc)




Te “ ^ePe +86 (4.B.lf)
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(N x K t) matrices of the exogenous variables of each equation, the p, are (AT, x l) vectors
of unknown parameters associated with the exogenous variables, the y , are scalar 
unknown parameters associated with the endogenous variables, and the e, are the error 
terms. Time and individual subscripts are suppressed. The unit o f observation is the state. 
Data was collected for a period of six years (1991 - 1996).
The bootstrap estimation assumes a diagonal variance-covariance matrix:
To derive the parameter estimates substitute (4.B.lb) - (4.B.lf) into (4.B.la) to derive the 
reduced form
0




y ,  — (  ^ 2 ^ 2  ^ 2  ) y  2 "*” (  ^ 3 ^ 3  ^ 3)7 3 ^ 4  ) y  4 ( " ^ 5 ^ 5  ^ 5  ) " /  5
(^606 ^ e6 )y 6 + ^|Pl +E1
(4.B.3)
Next, separate the error terms, the parameters, and the X-matrices as
y. = *2(P2Y2) + + ^4(p4y4) + *s(p5Y5) + ^6(p6Y6) + *iPl + V! (4.B.4)
where
v, = (s, + y ,s2 + y3e3 + y4e4 + yse5 + y6e6). (4.B.5)
Rewrite (B.4) compactly as
y, = XTI + v . (4.B.6)
The variance of v is defined as
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<*: = or + r\ ■ i+ y] • i + r] ■ i + n  ■ °7 + r62 • 07 + 2/ : covfo> *2)+
2 / 3 cov^i >f  3) + 2/4 cov (f |, £ , )  + 2 / 5 c o v fo , f s) + 2/ 6 c o v fo ,£•6)
(4.B.7)
The covariances cov(e,, e; ) = 0 for i , j  = 2,3,4,5,6 and z * j . For re-sampling obtain
(y -  X h ) (y  -  X h )  
(N - K )
( 4 . B . 8 )
From (B.7) and (B.8) a -,2 = a -2 -  (0), where <f> is defined by right hand side of (B.7).
The sampling technique used for the bootstrap
Step 1: Estimate equations (B.la) to (B.lf) by the appropriate technique and obtain a f  as 
indicated above, <t 2,<t32,<t2 =1 from the Probit model, ct2 from (B.le) estimated 
by Tobit, and ct2 from (B.lf) estimated by OLS.
Step 2: From the reduced form equations calculate the predicted values o f the dependent 
variables.
Step 3: Generate random numbers. For each observation, the errors are distributed as
£0, =
vu '0








r,2 or!2 0"l 3 0"l4 cr.5
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Step 4: Generate u -  N (0, /) and &>' = (q^w)~ V (0,fi). Use these randomly generated 
errors and the predicted values of step 2, construct newy’, and estimate the 
parameters using this bootstrap sample. The dichotomous variables are generated 
as follows:
f 1 i f  y ’ >  0
Y ,= \  ' j  = 2.3.4 (4.B.11)
'  }o  i f  y \  <  0
Step 5: Repeat steps 3 - 4  T-times and estimate the variability of the estimates as
v a r f e ) = x H " v ‘ - (4.B.12)
1=1 * I
and
se(rrj = -JvarfrcJ . (4.B.13)
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCULSIONS
A common theme of the three essays o f this dissertation is cost containment in 
Medicaid. The first essay examined reimbursement rates of the two main components of 
the prescription drug price in the context of pharmaceutical drug expenditure levels. The 
second and third essays focussed on cost containment measures pertaining to inpatient 
hospital expenditures.
The primary purpose of the first essay was to analyze the extent to which interest 
groups, among other factors, influence reimbursement rates of the two components of 
pharmaceutical drugs under Medicaid at the state level. Understanding the factors which 
determine reimbursement rates, and, in particular, the magnitude of these relationships, is 
important for the following reasons. To the extent that differences in the political 
influence of interest groups result in differences in reimbursement rates we may expect 
there to be discrepancies in the treatment of the poor across states. This has important 
implications regarding the goal of Medicaid which is to provide medical services to the 
nation’s poor (1) in an equitable fashion and (2) in quantities and qualities comparable to 
those observed in the private health industry. These goals may be compromised to the 
extent that special interest groups influence reimbursement levels at the state level.
Furthermore, there are policy implications regarding recent arguments made in 
the U.S. Congress, concerning increased control over Medicaid at the state level. 
Proponents of state control point to advantages of the “efficiency” of localized 
adaptation. However, strong influence by interest groups at the state level would likely 
result in growing differences in program design and, consequently, greater disparities in
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the treatment of the poor across states, contradicting the goals of the program. Within 
the context of pharmaceutical drug reimbursement rates, access problems may arise in 
states which severally cut reimbursement rates.
The endogenous variables involve the dispensing fee and the percentage markup 
components of the pharmaceutical drug price. The percentage markup constitutes the 
difference between reimbursement rates and the actual acquisition cost of drug 
ingredients to pharmacists. The analysis employs the economic theory of legislation and 
median voter models to explain the variation in reimbursement rates. The dispensing fee 
and percentage markup equations are then considered in a larger system including the 
number of Medicaid recipients and the prescription drug expenditures of the state. The 
system was estimated using the three stage least squares estimator to take advantage of 
the contemporaneous correlation between the equations.
The results indicate that interest groups have significant influence on 
reimbursement levels of pharmaceutical drugs. Particularly, the pharmacist and 
physician groups are shown to have been successful in protecting their members' 
interests. Furthermore, reimbursement levels significantly effect Medicaid 
pharmaceutical drug expenditure levels. Therefore, interest groups also indirectly 
influence expenditure levels. An important policy implication is that discrepancies in the 
treatment of the poor would likely increase with a transfer of control over Medicaid from 
the federal to the state level.
The second essay analyzes the factors determining the adoption of Medicaid 
inpatient hospital cost containment policies. The purpose and importance of this essay 
are similar to those of the first. To the extent that different factors at the state level
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determine the probabilities of agencies adopting cost containment policies we may expect 
the treatment of the poor to be differential across states. As before the findings of this 
essay may have some implications for the goals of Medicaid and policies recently 
discussed in congress regarding the increased transfer of control over the program to the 
state level. Within the context of Medicaid inpatient hospital, strong utilization controls 
may make Medicaid patients a liability to hospitals. As a consequence, these hospitals 
would either eliminate or severely limit services offered to Medicaid eligibles. Stated 
differently, the quantity and quality of services rendered to Medicaid recipients would 
suffer.
The cost containment policies analyzed in this essay are (1) the adoption of a 
prospective payment system (PPS) based on diagnosis related groups (DRG), (2) the 
adoption of a PPS based on rate-of-increase controls, (3) the adoption of direct utilization 
controls, (4) the enrollment of Medicaid eligibles in managed care, and (5) the enrollment 
of Medicaid eligibles in capitated managed care. Similar to the first essay, the economic 
theory of legislation and the median voter model play an integral role in explaining the 
probabilities of states adopting inpatient hospital cost containment measures.
Both interest group and median voter variables are found to have significant 
influence on the probability of states adopting inpatient hospital cost containment 
measures. This implies that the quality and cost of Medicaid hospital care across the 
states will vary depending on the relative strength of interest groups as well as taxpayers’ 
generosity. Discrepancies in the treatment of the poor would likely increase with a 
transfer of control to the state level.
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The purpose of the third essay is a comparison of the relative effectiveness of 
alternative Medicaid inpatient hospital cost-containment policies. Medicaid agencies 
may attempt to control costs by (1) directly controlling prices and utilization of inpatient 
hospital services, (2) by employing market oriented managed care principles, or (3) by 
indirect controlling the size of the eligible population. The focus is on the first two 
alternatives.
States started experimenting with inpatient hospital cost-containment almost 
immediately following the enactment of Medicaid. During the 1980s they started 
adopting prospective payment mechanisms and direct utilization controls, and during the 
1990s the use of managed care started increasing rapidly. Which method achieves the 
largest savings? The endogenous variables of interest in this essay are Medicaid inpatient 
hospital expenditures, the endogenous variables discussed in the second essay, and the 
size of the Medicaid population.
The economic theory of legislation and the median voter model are used to 
explain the adoption of cost-containment policies. In addition to inpatient cost 
containment policies the model accounts for supply, demand, federal policy, substitute or 
complement services, and non-hospital cost-containment variables. A two stage 
estimation method is employed and standard errors are estimated using a bootstrap 
method. The results indicate that both direct control over prices or utilization and 
managed care are effective in reducing expenditure levels compared to the traditional fee- 
for-service methods. PPS generated larger saving than managed care, perhaps because 
the former is relatively well established, while the latter is still relatively new in 
Medicaid.
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